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Earnings from farming in many developing countries have been depressed by a pro-urban 
bias in own-country policies as well as by governments of richer countries favoring their 
farmers with import barriers and subsidies. Both sets of policies, which reduce national 
and global economic welfare and contribute to global inequality and poverty, have been 
undergoing reform since the 1980s. Using the LINKAGE model of the global economy and 
modifications to the pre-release of Version 7 of the GTAP protection database for 2004, 
this paper seeks to compare the effect of those reforms to date with those that would 
come from removing remaining agricultural and trade policies. Two sets of results are 
thus presented: one showing the effects of policy reforms between 1980-84 and 2004, the 
other showing what the removal of remaining distortions as of 2004 could be. Both sets 
of results indicate improvements in the real value of agricultural output and exports, the 
real returns to farm land and unskilled labor, and real net farm incomes in most 
developing country regions – despite the adverse effect on the international terms of trade 
for some developing countries that are net food importers or are enjoying preferential 
access to agricultural markets of high-income countries. Landowners in those high-
income countries still offering their farmers price supports could readily afford to 
compensate them from the benefits of removing remaining agricultural protectionism. 
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There has been a great deal of change over the past quarter of a century in policy 
distortions to agricultural incentives throughout the world: the anti-agricultural and anti-
trade biases of policies of many developing countries have been reduced, export subsidies 
of high-income countries have been cut, and some re-instrumentation toward less 
inefficient and less trade-distorting forms of support, particularly in Western Europe, has 
begun. However, applied rates of protection from agricultural import competition have 
continued to be on an upward trend in both rich and poor countries, notwithstanding the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture that aimed to bind and reduce farm tariffs. 
This chapter analyzes the net economic effects of agricultural price and trade 
policy changes around the world since the early 1980s, and compares those estimates 
with projections of how global markets, farm incomes and economic welfare as of 2004 
would change if remaining policy distortions were removed. That is, this combined 
retrospective and prospective analysis seeks to assess how far the world has come, and 
how far it still has to go, in removing the disarray in world agriculture that was so vividly 
portrayed in D. Gale Johnson’s seminal 1973 study of the issue – and which seemed to 
have worsened by the time he revised that book in the late 1980s (Johnson 1991). 
To quantify the impacts both of past reforms and current policies, we amend the 
distortions in the pre-release of Version 7 of the GTAP global protection database by 
replacing its applied tariffs with distortion rates that reproduce those estimated, using 
domestic-to-border price comparisons, by authors of the developing country case studies 
in the present World Bank project.
1
                                                 
1 That distortions database is documents in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) and is based on the 
methodology described in Anderson et al. (2008a,b). 
 We likewise generate a set of distortions for the 
period 1980-84, again aiming to reproduce trend distortion rates in the country case 
studies. Those two sets of distortion estimates suggest that while average distortions to 2 
 
incentives facing developing country farmers generally were much less in 2004 than in 
the early 1980s, nonetheless there remains a considerable range of rates across 
commodities and countries, including a strong anti-trade bias in agricultural policies for 
many countries. Furthermore, non-agricultural protectionism is still rife in some 
developing countries, and agricultural price supports in some high-income countries 
remain high. 
Among other things, the present analysis is able to address questions such as the 
following: To what extent have government trade and domestic agricultural policies 
reduced their distorting effects on agricultural markets and farm incomes since the early 
1980s? Are policies as of 2004 still reducing farmer rewards in developing countries and 
thereby prolonging inequality across countries in farm household incomes? Are they 
depressing value added more in primary agriculture than in the rest of the economy of 
developing countries, and earnings of unskilled workers more than of owners of other 
factors of production, thereby potentially contributing to inequality and poverty within 
those developing countries? With farm incomes well below non-farm incomes in most 
developing countries, and with agriculture there being intensive in the use of unskilled 
labor, past or prospective rises in agricultural relative to non-agricultural value added and 
in wages for the unskilled relative to skilled wages and capital earnings would indicate a 
likely reduction in inequality and poverty. 
To provide answers to these and related questions, we use our amended GTAP 
distortion database in a global computable general equilibrium model (the LINKAGE 
model) to assess how agricultural markets, factor prices and value added in agriculture 
versus non-farm sectors would differ if (a) 1980-84 distortion rates were still in place and 
(b) if all price and trade policies that distort markets for farm and non-farm goods as of 
2004 were removed. It is important to include nonagricultural trade policies in the reform 
experiment because, as shown in the seminal study by Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988), 
they were at least as harmful to developing country farmers as were those countries’ 
agricultural policies. 
Results are presented first for the key countries and regions of the world and for 
the world as a whole, beginning with national economic welfare. We also present results 3 
 
for numerous individual countries.
2
The paper begins with an examination of the extent of price distortions in 2004 
and 1980-84 as we have calibrated them, the emphasis being mainly on import tariffs in 
the case of non-farm products but, in the case of agriculture, also production and export 
taxes and subsidies. This is followed by a description of the LINKAGE model of the global 
economy to be used to analyze the consequences of removing those distortions. The key 
results of the two sets of simulations are then presented, beginning with the retrospective 
experiment. The bottom-line results for net farm incomes from both experiments are 
presented for global liberalization of all merchandise, as well as for reform of just 
agricultural policies. After comparing these results with earlier ones generated using the 
GTAP protection database Version 6,
 While no-one anticipates a move to completely free 
markets globally in the near future, the comparison with the 1980-84 results provides a 
sense of perspective on what is still in prospect relative to what the world has already 
been through in terms of policy changes over the past quarter century. The prospective 
analysis also serves as a benchmark to suggest what is at stake in terms of further reforms 
either unilaterally of via WTO rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. At the same time, 
by showing how different the trade patterns of various countries would be without 
distortion it also provides a better indication of agricultural comparative advantages in 
different parts of the world than is available by looking at actual trade and self-
sufficiency indicators in the current distortion-ridden situation.  
3
Key distortions in global markets 






                                                 
2   Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988), like Jensen, Robinson and Tarp (2002), focus on effects of just 
own-country policies, the first using partial equilibrium and the second using national general 
equilibrium models. On the relationship between those two methodologies, see Bautista, Robinson, 
Wobst and Tarp (2001). 
3   Some of the questions raised here were addressed (but using the GTAP Version 6 protection database) 
by Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe(2006a) who use the same Linkage model as in the 
present analysis, and by Anderson and Valenzuela (2007a) using the GTAP-AGR model.  4 
 
Border measures traditionally have been the main means by which governments distort 
prices in their domestic markets for products, with the relative prices of the various 
tradables being affected by trade taxes-cum-subsidies. Product-specific domestic output 
or farm input subsidies have played a more limited role, in part because of their much 
greater overt cost to the treasury. In principle services trade and foreign investment 
distortions also could distort incentives in the agricultural and industrial sectors, but they 
are ignored here because much controversy still surrounds their measurement and how 
they should be modeled.
4
To quantify the impacts both of past reforms and current policies, we use the 
Altertax procedure (Malcolm 1998) to amend the distortions in the pre-release of Version 
7 of the GTAP global protection database.
 
5 The amendments are mainly for developing 
countries but, following Anderson and Valenzuela (2007b), we also alter cotton 
distortions in the United States to better reflect policies there. To simplify the discussion 
below, European transition economies (in which we include Turkey) are treated as one of 
the world’s developing country regions, the others being Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America.
6
The latest pre-release of Version 7 of the GTAP database includes estimates of 
bilateral tariffs and export subsidies and of domestic supports as of 2004 for more than 
100 countries and country groups spanning the world. As with Version 6 of the GTAP 
dataset (which relates to 2001), the protection data come from a joint CEPII (Paris)/ITC 
(Geneva) project known as MAcMaps. MAcMaps is a detailed database on bilateral 
import protection at the HS6 tariff line level that integrates trade preferences, specific and 




                                                 
4   This is reflected in the results emerging from attempts to include services distortions in trade reform 
modeling, which have led to widely differing results. Compare, for example, Brown, Deardorff and 
Stern (2003), Francois, van Meijl and van Tongeren (2005), and Hertel and Keeney (2006), 
5 Version 7 is yet to be publicly documented, but see Dimaranan (2006) regarding Version 6 or go to 
www.gtap.org. 
6 We have no new distortion estimates for countries in the Middle East, so in what follows little attention is 
given to this small and relatively affluent part of the global agricultural economy. 
 The new Version 7 GTAP database for 2004 has lower tariffs than the previous 
database for 2001, because of major reforms such as completing the implementation of 
7   More information on the MAcMaps database is available in Bouët et al. (2004) and at 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/macmap.htm. For details of its incorporation into the GTAP 
Version 6 dataset, see Dimaranan (2006).  5 
 
the Uruguay Round agreements and unilateral reforms including those resulting from 
WTO accession negotiations by China and other recent acceding countries. 
As mentioned above, in the case of agriculture in developing countries the 
distortion levels in that database have been replaced with an alternative set for numerous 
developing countries, based on nominal rate of assistance estimates for 2004 that have 
come from the present World Bank project (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008; Valenzuela 
and Anderson 2008). The sectoral averages of these amended values are shown in Table 1 
for 2004, and also for 1980-84. In the case of amendments to the import tariffs on 
individual farm products for any particular developing country, the bilateral tariff 
structure in the GTAP Version 7 database is preserved by simply lowering or raising the 
bilateral tariffs by the same proportion we amend the average tariff on each product for 
2004.
8
According to this amended dataset, the weighted average applied tariff for 
agriculture and lightly processed food in 2004 was 21.8 percent for developing countries 
and 22.3 percent for high-income countries, while for non-farm goods it was 7.5 percent 
for developing countries and just 1.2 percent for high-income countries. Export subsidies 
for farm products for a few high-income regions, and export taxes in a few developing 
countries, were still in place in 2004, but they are generally small in their impact 
compared with tariffs, as are production subsidies and taxes.
  
9
The averages obscure large variations across countries and commodities. Of 
particular note are the agricultural tariffs. The rise in the average of those tariffs for 
 In 1980-84, however, 
developing countries had an average agricultural export tax of 11 percent while high-
income countries who had an average farm export subsidy of 21 percent, and the average 
agricultural import tariff was lower then for developing countries (16 percent) but higher 
for high-income countries (26 percent) compared with their common 22 percent in 2004. 
As well, tariffs on non-agricultural imports were more than three times higher in 1980-84 
than in 2004 for developing countries (Table 1).  
                                                 
8 We also preserve that bilateral tariff structure for 1980-84, so as to capture the changes only in average 
distortions for each product and not changes in the bilateral preferential contributions to those 
averages. 
9 Using the GTAP Version 6 database for 2001, Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela (2006) found that 
agricultural production and export subsidies together contributed just 7 percent of the global welfare 
cost of agricultural protection. 6 
 
developing countries since 1980-84 is representative for Africa and Europe’s transition 
economies, but it fell in Latin America and in much of Asia – although the rise in Korea 
was so dramatic as to cause the Asian average to increase by one-third (Table 1).  
The averages on their own are not necessarily good indicators of overall 
distortions to farmers’ incentives, although it certainly helps to see relative rates of 
assistance to agriculture versus non-agricultural goods (which is why RRAs have been 
emphasized in the preceding chapters). Also of importance is the composition of each 
country’s trade. Three examples serve to illustrate the point. First, if high-income 
countries’ tariffs on temperate farm products are at a near-prohibitive level but are zero 
on tropical products such as coffee beans, those countries’ import-weighted average 
agricultural tariff could be quite low even though agricultural value added in those rich 
countries had been enhanced substantially. A second illustration is the case of a 
developing country with a strong agricultural comparative advantage in all but one small 
farming industry, and with high tariffs to stave off import competition for that industry 
and for all manufacturing industries. Overall agricultural value added would be depressed 
by that structure of protection, yet the import-weighted average tariff protection for 
agriculture would be high and possibly above that for manufactures. A third example is 
where the non-agricultural primary sector receives a similar level of import protection as 
the farm sector and less than the manufacturing sector, but is much more export-focused 
than agriculture: trade reform may cause that other primary sector to expand at the 
expense not only of manufacturing but also of farming. Even though we have used 
production rather than trade weights to get sectoral averages rates of distortion in Table, 
and even though the ratio of agricultural to other goods’ tariffs for 2004 in that table is 
well above unity for many of the regions shown, it is not possible to say from those 
distortion rates alone whether developing country policies have overshot in terms of 
moving away from an anti-agricultural bias. Equally, it is not possible to know how the 
benefits of removal of agricultural tariffs in the protective countries would be distributed 
among the various agricultural-exporting countries. What is needed to address such issues 
is a global general equilibrium model to estimate the net effects of all sectors’ distortions 
in all countries on the various nations’ agricultural markets and net farm incomes, to 




The LINKAGE model of the global economy 
 
 
The model used for this analysis is the World Bank’s global computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model, known as LINKAGE (van der Mensbrugghe 2005). For most of 
this decade it has formed the basis for the World Bank’s standard long-term projections 
of the world economy and for much of its trade (and more recently migration) policy 
analysis (e.g., World Bank 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006). It is a relatively straightforward 
CGE model but with some characteristics that distinguish it from other comparative static 
models such as the GTAP model (described in Hertel 1997). Factor stocks are fixed, 
which means in the case of labor that the extent of unemployment (if any) in the baseline 
remains unchanged. Producers minimize costs subject to constant returns to scale 
production technology, consumers maximize utility, and all markets – including for labor 
– are cleared with flexible prices. There are three types of production structures. Crop 
sectors reflect the substitution possibilities between extensive and intensive farming; 
livestock sectors reflect the substitution possibilities between pasture and intensive 
feeding; and all other sectors reflect standard capital/labor substitution. There are two 
types of labor, skilled and unskilled, and the total employment of each is assumed fixed 
(so no change in their unemployment levels). There is a single representative household 
per modeled region, allocating income to consumption using the extended linear 
expenditure system. Trade is modeled using a nested Armington structure in which 
aggregate import demand is the outcome of allocating domestic absorption between 
domestic goods and aggregate imports, and then aggregate import demand is allocated 
across source countries to determine the bilateral trade flows.
10
Government fiscal balances are fixed in US dollar terms, with the fiscal objective 
being met by changing the level of lump sum taxes on households. This implies that 
 
                                                 
10   The size of the Armington elasticities matters, see Zhang (2006, 2008) and Valenzuela, Anderson and 
Hertel (2007). The Linkage model assumes larger values than some other models because it is seeking 
to estimate long-run consequences of liberalization. An example of the difference this can make to the 
results is detailed in Table 12A.2 in Anderson and Martin (2006).  8 
 
losses of tariff revenues are replaced by higher direct taxes on households. The current 
account balance also is fixed. Given that other external financial flows are fixed, this 
implies that ex ante changes to the trade balance are reflected in ex post changes to the 
real exchange rate. For example, if import tariffs are reduced, the propensity to import 
increases and additional imports are financed by increasing export revenues. The latter 
typically is achieved by a depreciation of the real exchange rate. Finally, investment is 
driven by savings. With fixed public and foreign saving, investment comes from changes 
in the savings behavior of households and from changes in the unit cost of investment. 
The model only solves for relative prices, with the numéraire, or price anchor, being the 
export price index of manufactured exports from high-income countries. This price is 
fixed at unity in the base year. 
A virtue of beginning with the latest GTAP database (pre-release 5 of Version 7) 
is that it includes bilateral tariffs that capture not only reciprocal but also non-reciprocal 
preferential trade agreements, the latter providing low-income exporters duty-free access 
to protected high-income country markets. This allows us to take into account the fact 
that future reform may cause a decline in the international terms of trade for those 
developing countries that are enjoying preferential access to agricultural and other 
markets of high-income countries (in addition to those that are net food importers because 
their comparative advantage is in other sectors such as labor-intensive manufacturing). 
The version of the LINKAGE model used for this study is based on an aggregation 
involving 24 sectors and 52 regions spanning the world (see Appendix Table A). There is 
an emphasis on agriculture and food, which comprise half of those 24 sectors. Note that, 
consistent with the rest of the present project, and with WTO, we include Korea and 
Taiwan in the ‘developing country’ category.
11
                                                 
11   The more-affluent economies of Hong Kong and Singapore are in our high-income category but, since 




Retrospective analysis: how different would 2004 have been if the agricultural and 




This section summarizes results from the scenarios in which 1980-84 distortion rates 
replace those for 2004. We thereby examine simultaneously the effects of high-income 
country liberalization of agricultural policies and the reduction in the anti-agricultural and 
anti-farm trade policy biases in developing countries without and with liberalization also 
of non-agricultural trade policies (to sense the relative contribution of the latter to the 
overall result for net farm incomes). We begin with global and national economic welfare 
effects, then look at changes in the terms of trade, adjustments to quantities produced and 
traded, effects on factor rewards, and then percentage changes to agricultural value added 
(net farm income) relative to value added in the rest of the economy.  
 
Global and national economic welfare 
 
The LINKAGE model and our distortions database provide a baseline projection of the 
world economy in 2004. This is first compared with a simulation in which all agricultural 
domestic and border subsidies and taxes plus import tariffs on other merchandise are 
replaced with the distortion structures of 1980-84, as summarized in Table 1. Our 
LINKAGE model suggests that without the reforms over the intervening two decades, the 
world in 2004 would have been worse off by $233 billion per year. (Keep in mind that a 
negative sign in this experiment has the same meaning as a positive sign in the next 
experiment, since both sets of simulations are using 2004 policies as their baseline.) The 
distribution across regions of that change in economic welfare (or equivalent variation in 
income), reported in Table 2, suggests two-thirds of those dollars accrued to high-income 
countries. However, as a share of national income, developing countries gained more, 
with an average increase of 1.0 percent compared with 0.7 percent for high-income 
countries. The results vary across developing countries, ranging from slight losses in a 
few cases to large proportional increases in such cases as China, Mozambique and 
Nigeria.  
The second column of numbers and those in parentheses in Table 2 shows the 
amount of that welfare gain due to changes in the international terms of trade for each 
country. For developing countries as a group the terms of trade effect is adverse, while 10 
 
the opposite is the case for high-income countries. Nonetheless, even though that terms of 
trade change reduced their gains from improved efficiency of domestic resource use, 
developing country economies have benefited proportionately more than high-income 
economies from those policy reforms of the past quarter-century. 
 
Decomposing the contribution to welfare of changes in national terms of trade 
 
To understand the contribution to welfare of the changes in international terms of trade 
shown in Table 2, it is necessary to first examine the changes in import and export prices 
for farm and other products. For developing countries as a group, their terms of trade 
have worsened because of these reform for two sets of reasons: for non-agricultural goods 
their export prices have been lowered by 0.4 percent while their import prices have hardly 
been affected; and for farm products their lowered export prices (0.6 percent) have been 
compounded by 16 percent higher prices for their agricultural and food imports. The net 
effect is a deterioration of 1.7 percent in their terms of trade. By contrast, high-income 
countries enjoyed an improvement of 0.8 percent in their terms of trade as a result of the 
policy changes, partly from non-farm products but mostly from farm products, where the 
improvement in their export prices more than offset the higher prices of their imports 
(Table 3).  
The contributions of those four elements to national economic welfare can be seen 
in Table 4. Overall the terms of trade effect for developing countries diminishes their 
welfare gains from reform by $49 billion to bring it down to $73 billion per year. Of that, 
two-fifths is from the decline in their agricultural export prices (in part because of less 
taxation and hence larger volumes of those exports now), another two-fifths from the 
decline in prices of non-farm exports, and one-fifth from the rise in prices of their food 
imports (partly because of reduced assistance to farmers in high-income countries). For 
high-income countries, on the other hand, their reduction in agricultural tariffs and 
subsidies and the consequent rise in international food prices helps farm exporters more 
than it hurts import-competing farmers in this group, and the improvement in welfare 
from lower prices of non-farm imports more than offsets the loss due to lower prices for 
their non-farm exports. 11 
 
 
Quantities produced and traded 
 
The retrospective results suggest that, as a result of the reforms of the past two decades, 
the developing countries’ aggregate shares of global output and exports of textiles and 
apparel have grown by about 3 percentage points while the shares for other non-farm 
products have changed by no more than one percentage point. Their shares in agricultural 
and food markets, however, have changed more: their share of the world’s primary 
agricultural exports has risen from 43 to 55 percent and the output share from 58 to 62 
percent, and even their shares of processed foods have risen by one percentage point. The 
rises have occurred in nearly all agricultural industries, the exceptions being rice and 
sugar where the growth in protectionism in high-income countries has been greatest.  
The share of global production of farm products that is exported (excluding intra-
EU trade) is slightly smaller as a result of the reforms, in contrast to the 5 percentage 
point rise for textiles and clothing and the 3 point rise for other manufactures. 
Agriculture’s 8 percent share in 2004 remains in stark contrast to the 31 percent share for 
other primary products and to around 25 percent for all other goods, and this ‘thinness’ is 
an important contributor to the volatility of international prices for these weather-
dependent farm products (first columns of Table 5). The fact that the past two decades of 
reform has not made agricultural production more traded globally is illuminating. The 
findings summarized in Anderson (2009) show that the reforms in developing and high-
income countries over the past two decades have reduced the anti-trade bias in the 
agricultural trade of developing countries but increased that bias in high-income countries 
(thanks in part to the cut in their export subsidies). According to this Linkage Model 
result, the latter slightly more than offsets the former in terms of their aggregate impact 
on the global share of farm production that is traded. 
The impacts on agricultural and food output and trade for various countries and 
regions suggest farm trade would have been two-thirds bigger in real value terms had the 
past two decades of reform not occurred (last row of Table 6). On the export side that is 
almost entirely due to high-income countries, whose exports would have been more than 
twice as large had they not lowered their export subsidies and developing countries not 12 
 
lowered their export taxes. The global value of agricultural and food output, however is 
virtually unchanged (just 3.6 percent less). This suggests that, in aggregate, the reform-
induced output decline of high-income countries (11 percent) more than fully offset the 
reform-induced output expansion of developing countries (3 percent). Note that the big 
economies of China and South Asia, as well as Thailand and most of Latin America, all 
enjoyed increased farm output because of the past quarter-century’s reforms. Note also 
what happens to agricultural imports: in real value terms developing countries as a group 
would have had to import 50 percent more farm products in 2004 had the reforms not 
taken place of the past two decades, while high-income countries would have had to 
import nearly 80 percent more (last column of Table 6). Combined with the export 
effects, that means the food and agricultural self sufficiency ratio would have been very 
slightly lower in developing countries and slightly higher in high-income countries (Table 
7). The extent of this reform on the tradability of different product is shown in Table 8. 
Sugar, milk products and cotton would have been exported more from developing to 
high-income countries had the latter group’s assistance to those industries not grown over 
the past two decades. 
The net consequences of these impacts on the share of farm production exported 
by regions are shown in Table 9. For developing countries as a group there is no change 
for its 9.5 percent share, while for high-income countries the share is reduced by 3 
percentage points by their export subsidy cuts and other reforms, to 13 percent (including 
intra-EU trade).  
 
Effects on product prices 
 
How do different agricultural and manufacturing goods’ average prices in international 
markets change with liberalization of distortionary agricultural policies and other 
protection? That depends not only on the changes in the nominal rates of assistance but 
also on the relative size of each sub-sector and the different degrees of responsiveness of 
inputs to changes in relative output prices, and on the method used to weigh different 
countries’ price changes. According to the Linkage model with its default elasticities and 
(Paasche) weighting methods, the average real price in international markets would have 13 
 
been 13 percent lower for agricultural and food products had policies not changed over 
the past two decades (Table 10). International prices for farms goods are higher now 
despite the substantial reduction in the anti-agricultural policy bias in developing 
countries since the early 1980s: the effect of that is evidently more than offset by the 
reduction in agricultural tariffs and subsidies in high-income countries. 
 
Effects on factor rewards 
 
The relatively small percentage changes in net national economic welfare, reported in 
Table 2, hide the fact that redistributions of welfare among groups within each country 
following trade reform can be much larger. This is clear from the impacts on real rewards 
to labor, capital and land that are reported in Table 11, where factor rewards are 
expressed in real terms by deflating by the aggregate consumer price index. Those results 
suggest that reform has raised the food price index by half a point while lowering by one-
fifth of a point the overall CPI index. Unskilled workers in developing countries, 
according to these results, are better off from reform than skilled workers or capital 
owners; and if they are also agricultural landowners they have gained from increased 
rewards for that factor too. For high-income countries, consistent with standard trade 
theory, skilled workers gained at the expense of unskilled workers and agricultural land 
rents have halved over what they would have been. Those European and Northeast Asian 
farmers renting agricultural land would have benefited from the large fall in farm rental 
costs, more or less offsetting the fall in prices for their output, while earnings of 
landowners in those countries would decline. Their loss is relative to the no-reform 
baseline, which ignores the fact that such farm landowners have long enjoyed protection-
inflated returns, in some cases for decades prior to the 1980s. 
 
Effects on sectoral value added 
 
Of crucial interest in terms of these policies’ impact on inequality and poverty is how 
they have affected value added in agriculture, in other words net farm income. For 
poverty it matters how much that indicator changes in absolute terms in lower-income 14 
 
countries (given that three quarters of the world’s poor are farmers in developing 
countries), while for within-country inequality it matters also how much it changes 
relative to value added in non-farm sectors. These results are reported in Table 12. 
The results show that for developing countries as a group, value added in 
agriculture is 4.9 percent higher than it would have been without reform over the past two 
decades, compared with just 0.4 percent for non-agriculture. A similar-sized 
improvement has occurred in high-income countries for non-agriculture, but there net 
farm incomes would have been 36 percent higher without the global reforms. For East 
Asia and Latin America the gain to farmers is twice as much, for South Asia and North 
Africa it is less than half as much, and for Sub-Saharan Africa the gain is just above the 
developing country average (although farmers in South Africa and Nigeria are made 
substantially worse off). However, among the countries listed in Africa, net farm incomes 
would increase substantially only in Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and for the 
continent as a whole they would fall very slightly (by less than 1 percent). Partly that is 
because non-agricultural primary sectors – in which numerous African countries have a 
strong comparative advantage – have expanded (raising Africa’s self-sufficiency in that 
sector from 182 to 191 percent), and that in turn has boosted non-tradables production 
and employment. Net farm incomes are estimated to have fallen also in Bangladesh and 
Vietnam, but there it is textiles and clothing that expand. 
 
 
Prospective effects of removing 2004 price-distorting policies globally 
 
 
In the light of the above assessment of partial reform over the past two decades, we turn 
now to examining what could result from removing the remaining policies as of 2004. In 
this case the scenarios involve full global liberalization of both agricultural policies and 
non-agricultural goods trade policies.  
 
Global and national economic welfare 
 15 
 
Beginning with the baseline projection of the world economy in 2004, all agricultural 




removed globally. Our LINKAGE model suggests that would lead to a global gain of $168 
billion per year (Table 13). That compares with the above estimate of $233 billion per 
year from the partial reform since the early 1980s (Table 2), suggesting that in a global 
economic welfare sense, by 2004 the world had moved three-fifths of the way towards 
global free trade in goods. As a share of national income, developing countries would 
gain nearly twice as much as high-income gains by completing that reform process (an 
average increase of 0.9 percent compared with 0.5 percent for high-income countries). 
The results vary widely across developing countries, ranging from slight losses in the 
case of some South Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries that would suffer 
exceptionally large adverse terms of trade changes (and thus be worthy candidates for 
‘Aid-for-Trade’ assistance as envisaged as part of the WTO’s Doha Development 
Agenda) to 8 percent increases in the case of Ecuador (whose main export item, bananas 
is currently heavily discriminated in the EU market where former colonies and least 
developed countries enjoy preferential duty-free access).  
The second column of numbers and those in parentheses in Table 13 shows the 
amount of that welfare gain due to changes in the international terms of trade for each 
country. For developing countries as a group the terms of trade effect is slightly negative, 
and conversely for high-income countries. 
 
Regional and sectoral distribution of welfare effects 
One way to way to decompose the real income gains from full removal of price 
distortions globally, so as to better understand the sources for each region, is to assess the 
impacts of developing country liberalization versus high-income country liberalization in 
different economic sectors. These results are provided in Table 14. They suggest global 
liberalization of agriculture and food markets would contribute 60 percent of the total 
                                                 
12   The only other policy change is the removal of export taxes on non-farm products in Argentina This is 
done because they were introduced at the same time (end-2001) and for the same reason (for the 
government to gain popular support from the urban poor) as were the country’s export taxes on farm 
products.   16 
 
global gains from merchandise reform. This is similar to the 63 per cent found for 2015 
by Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006b) using the earlier Version 6 of the 
GTAP database anchored on 2001 estimates of distortions. This robust result is 
remarkable given the low shares of agriculture and food in global GDP and global 
merchandise trade (less than 9 percent). For developing countries, the importance of 
agricultural policies is even greater at 83 percent (compared with just 5 percent for high-
income countries – see row 7 of Table 14).  
Three-fifths of those global gains from removing agricultural policies are 
accounted for by the farm policies of high-income countries (columns 3 and 6 of Table 
14). Those policies also account for just over half of the overall gains from trade reform 
to developing countries, while developing country farm policies are responsible for 30 
percent that region’s gains (columns 1 and 3 of Table 14). That is, if only high-income 
countries were to liberalize their agricultural markets – as some countries have suggested 
in the WTO’s on-going Doha trade negotiations – that would provide less than two-thirds 
of the potential gains to developing countries from global farm policy reform. 
 
Quantities produced and traded 
 
The full liberalization results suggest there would be little change in the developing 
countries’ aggregate shares of global output and exports of non-farm products other than 
for textiles and apparel. Their shares in agricultural and processed food markets, 
however, change noticeable: the export share rises from 54 to 64 percent and the output 
share rises from 46 to 50 percent. More significantly, the rises occur in nearly all 
agricultural and food industries. As a result, the share of global production of farm 
products that is exported rises dramatically for many industries and, for the sector as a 
whole, increases from 8 to 13 percent excluding intra-EU trade (Table 15). That 
‘thickening’ of international food markets would have a substantial dampening effect on 
the instability of prices and quantities traded in those markets. 
The impact of full trade reform on agricultural and food output and trade is shown 
for each country/region in Table 16, where it is clear that global farm trade is enhanced 
by more than one-third whereas the global value of output is virtually unchanged, 17 
 
dropping just 2.6 percent. This suggests that, in aggregate, the pro-agricultural policies of 
high-income countries are not quite fully offset by the policies of developing countries – 
whereas the anti-trade biases in policies of both groups of countries reinforce each other. 
The increase in exports of those goods from developing countries would be a huge $163 
billion per year. Certainly Latin America accounts for nearly half of that increase, but all 
developing regions’ exports expand. This means their share of production exported would 
be much higher. Table 17 shows it would increase for almost all developing countries, 
rising in aggregate for the group from 10 to 17 percent.  
Also of interest is what happens to agricultural imports: developing countries as a 
group would see them growing less than farm exports (Table 16). That means their food 
and agricultural self sufficiency ratios would rise, although in aggregate only slightly. For 
high-income countries that ratio would fall five percentage points (slightly less if Eastern 
Europe is included), while in East Asia and Africa it would rise two to three points, for 
South Asia it would be unchanged, and for Latin America it would jump from 112 to 126 
percent (Table 18).  
As already mentioned, such reform also raises substantially the share of 
agricultural and food production that is exported globally, thereby ‘thickening’ 
international markets, which would dampen international food price fluctuations and 
thereby reduce concerns about vulnerability to import dependence. The extent of this 
global public good aspect of agricultural trade reform can be sensed for different products 
from the results reported in Tables 19. Highly protected sugar and milk, as well as grains 
and oilseeds, are especially noteworthy. Also noteworthy from that table is the extent to 
which the developing country shares of output exported rise for certain products. The 
share of their grain production that is exported would double, and for meat it would more 
than double while for sugar it would rise nearly four-fold. Cotton (plant-based fibers) too 
would become more of the domain of developing countries.  
 
Effects on product and factor prices 
 
How do different agricultural prices in international markets change with liberalization of 
distortionary agricultural policies and other protection? The average real international 18 
 
prices of agricultural and lightly processed food products would be only 1.3 percent 
higher in the absence of all merchandise trade distortions, or 2.0 percent if just 
agricultural policies were liberalized (Table 20). The net effects of present distortions are 
especially dampening the international prices of beef, milk, rice and cotton. But they are 
propping up the prices of some other products, because of export taxes still in place in 
some developing countries, most notably Argentina.  
The redistributions of welfare among groups within each country following trade 
reform can be much larger than the aggregate change, because of the impacts on real 
rewards to labor, capital and land. Those effects are reported in Table 21, where factor 
rewards are deflated by the overall consumer price index. It happens that food prices 
would fall more than that overall CPI index. Consistent with trade theory, those results 
suggest unskilled workers in developing countries – the majority of whom work on farms 
– would benefit most from reform, followed by skilled workers, then capital owners. 
Returns to immobile agricultural land also rise in developing countries, but by less than 
for more-mobile factors. Insofar as unskilled workers spend a higher share of their 
income on food than the average citizen, these results understate the extent of their gain. 
These results suggest both inequality and poverty could be alleviated by such reform.  
 
Effects on sectoral value added 
 
Of crucial interest in terms of these policies’ impact on inequality and poverty is how 
they affect value added in agriculture, in other words net farm income. These results for 
full global reform are reported in the first four columns of Table 22. 
The results show that for developing countries as a group, value added in 
agriculture rises by 5.6 percent, compared with 1.9 percent for non-agriculture, following 
full global reform of all merchandise trade. Latin America is where net farm income 
expands most, averaging 37 percent but exceeding 100 percent for Argentina and 
Ecuador and 40-50 percent for Brazil and Colombia. In East Asia it also expands 
considerably, and more than non-agricultural value added – including in China. However, 
among the countries listed in Africa, net farm incomes would increase substantially only 
in Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and for the continent as a whole they would fall 19 
 
very slightly (by less than 1 percent). Partly that is because non-agricultural primary 
sectors – in which numerous African countries have a strong comparative advantage – 
would expand (raising Africa’s self-sufficiency in that sector from 180 to 189 percent – 
see Table 18), and that in turn would boost production and employment of non-tradable 
goods and services. Net farm incomes are estimated to fall also in South Asia (by 7 
percent), but there it is textiles and clothing that would expand (raising self-sufficiency 
from 144 to 153 percent) and, in India where the skilled/unskilled wage differential rises, 
also skill-intensive goods and services production. 
 
Comparison with previous results based on Version 6 GTAP protection data  
 
Results from global CGE models can differ for myriad reasons, even when the same 
model is used (van der Mensbrugghe 2006; Valenzuela, Anderson and Hertel 2007). The 
current full liberalization results in this section use the same model and same prospective 
global reform experiment as in Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006a), and 
differ in just two important respects (Valenzuela and Anderson 2008). One is that the 
present results refer to the world economy with its distortions as of 2004 whereas the 
earlier exercise took 2001 as its base, projected the world forward to 2005 to include 
some key policy reforms over those four years, and then projected another decade to 2015 
by which time developing countries are a larger share of the modeled global economy. 
The other difference is the use in the present exercise of the new 2004 agricultural 
distortions database for developing countries. As can be seen in the first column of 
Appendix Table A, the estimates of assistance via trade taxes for agricultural and lightly 
processed food are somewhat lower for the developing country regions in the new 2004 
data set based on price comparisons than is the case in the GTAP one based 
predominantly on import tariffs. In particular, some agricultural export taxes are included 
in the revised distortions to incentives, particularly in Argentina where they average 21 
percent for agricultural products. With these differences, modeling a move to global free 
trade would generate less import growth and more export growth in farm products for 
developing countries, but to differing degrees in different regions.  20 
 
In these new results, the developing countries’ share of global agricultural and 
food output rises from 46 to 50 percent, and of exports from 54 to 64 percent (compared 
with rises from 54 to 56 percent and from 51 to 55 percent, respectively, in the Anderson, 
Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006a) study). The overall value of agricultural output 
in developing countries rises 7 percent in these new results compared with just 2 percent 
previously. A major part of that difference is due to the simulated removal of Argentina’s 
export taxes, which causes Argentina’s farm output to jump. 
Those Argentinean export taxes are also partly responsible for a smaller set of 
impacts of liberalization on international prices of farm products. For primary agricultural 
prices in aggregate, the impact reported in Table 20 above, of 0.9 percent, compares with 
an average of 5.5 percent in Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 2006a, Table 
15).  
These differences affect the new economic welfare results for South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa especially. Previously both regions were estimated to gain from 
global reform, whereas the new estimates suggest they may lose slightly (0.1 percent). 
South Asian farmers lose less in the current results than previously, however, because the 








By way of summing up, several key findings from this study are worth emphasizing, 
beginning with those from the retrospective experiment of comparing what 2004 would 
have been had the agricultural price and trade policy reforms over the past quarter 
century not taken place: 
•  without those policy reforms, the world in 2004 would have been worse off by 
$233 billion per year; 
•  even though it depressed their terms of trade, developing economies benefited 
proportionately more than high-income economies (1.0 percent compared with 
0.7 percent of national income) from those policy reforms; 
•  the developing countries’ share of the world’s primary agricultural exports rose 
from 43 to 55 percent, and its farm output share from 58 to 62 percent, because of 
those reforms, with rises in nearly all agricultural industries except rice and sugar 
where the growth in protectionism in high-income countries has been greatest; 
•  the share of global farm production exported (excluding intra-EU trade) in 2004 
was slightly smaller as a result of those reforms since 1980-84, because of less 
farm export subsidies, so agriculture’s 8 percent share in 2004 remains in stark 
contrast to the 31 percent share for other primary products and the 25 percent for 
all other goods – a ‘thinness’ that is an important contributor to the volatility of 
international prices for weather-dependent farm products;  
•  the average real price in international markets would have been 13 percent lower 
for agricultural and food products had policies not changed over the past quarter 
century; 
•  for developing countries as a group, value added in agriculture is 4.9 percent 
higher than it would have been without those reform, more than ten times the 
proportional gain of just 0.4 percent for non-agriculture; 
 
The findings from the second experiment, aimed at understanding the effects of 
the policies remaining in place as of 2004 are equally stark: 22 
 
•  their global welfare cost is $168 billion per year which, when compared with the 
estimated gain of $233 billion annually from the partial reform since the early 
1980s, suggests that in a global welfare sense the world had moved three-fifths of 
the way towards global free trade in goods between the early 1980s and the mid 
2000s; 
•  as a share of national income, developing countries would gain nearly twice as 
much as high-income countries by completing that reform process (an average 
increase of 0.9 percent compared with 0.5 percent for high-income countries, but 
as high as 8 percent for banana-exporting Ecuador); 
•  of those prospective welfare gains from global liberalization, 60 percent would 
come from agriculture and food policy reform – a striking result given that the 
shares of agriculture and food in global GDP and global merchandise trade are 
less than 9 percent; 
•  the contribution of agricultural policy reform to the prospective welfare gain for 
developing countries is even greater, at 83 percent; 
•  but if only high-income countries were to liberalize their agricultural markets – as 
some countries have suggested in the WTO’s on-going Doha trade negotiations – 
that would provide less than two-thirds of the potential gains to developing 
countries from global agricultural policy reform; 
•  with full goods trade liberalization, the share of global production of farm 
products that is exported would rise from 8 to 13 percent excluding intra-EU 
trade, thereby ‘thickening’ international food markets and reducing instability of 
prices and quantities traded in those markets;  
•  unskilled workers in developing countries – the majority of whom work on farms 
– would benefit most from reform, followed by skilled workers and then capital 
owners; and 
•  net farm incomes in developing countries would rise by 5.6 percent, compared 
with 1.9 percent for non-agricultural value added, which is even more than the 
estimated gain from the partial reforms of the past quarter century. 
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Together, those last two findings suggest both inequality and poverty could be 
alleviated by such reform, given that three-quarters of the world’s poor are farmers in 
developing countries (Chen and Ravallion 2007). To get a more precise sense of whether 
that is so, and to explore the extent to which it is own-country as distinct from rest-of 
world’s policies that are doing the harm, requires country case studies using national 
economy-wide models that are enhanced with detailed earning and spending information 
of numerous types of urban and rural households. One set of such studies for a dozen or 
so countries across three continents is forthcoming in Anderson, Cockburn and Martin 
(2009).  
As for farmers in high-income countries, removal of agricultural price-supporting 
policies there would undoubtedly lead to painful reductions in income and wealth if not 
compensated, but compensation by the gainers in the rest of their societies could readily 
afford to compensate them from the benefits of freeing trade. The distortion estimates in 
Table 1 show that all high-income countries have lowered the price supports for their 
farmers since the 1980s. In some countries that has been partly replaced by assistance that 
is somewhat decoupled from production (not shown in that table). If that trend continues 
at the pace of the past quarter century, and if there is no growth of agricultural protection 
in developing countries, then before the middle of this century we may have removed 
most of the disarray in world food markets that so worried D. Gale Johnson through 
much of his academic life. However, if the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda collapses, 
and governments thereby find it more difficult to ward off agricultural protection lobbies, 
there is the possibility of the recent progress being reversed in high-income countries and 
of emerging economies – even those as poor as India – following the same agricultural 
protection path this century as that Anderson, Hayami and Others (1986) show was taken 
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Table 1: Structure of price distortions in global goods markets,
a 1980-84 and 2004  
                                                             (percent) 
 






















Subsidy  Tariff  Tariff 
Africa  -0.3  -2.5  17.0  12.6    -0.8  0.1  20.4  11.2 
Egypt  0.4  -6.6  5.8  22.5    0.0  0.0  5.0  13.5 
Madagascar  0.0  -4.4  3.4  13.9    0.0  -4.4  3.4  2.7 
Mozambique  0.2  -53.8  5.5  29.7    0.2  0.0  14.5  10.9 
Nigeria  2.6  22.5  22.2  0.1    0.1  0.0  76.1  17.2 
Senegal  0.0  -6.7  5.7  8.7    0.0  -1.1  6.2  8.9 
South Africa  0.0  5.6  18.1  5.8    0.0  0.0  10.2  6.5 
Uganda  -0.9  -14.1  16.1  50.1    0.0  -2.6  9.2  5.5 
Tanzania  5.5  -29.4  7.9  97.5    -0.3  0.0  11.8  13.7 
Zambia  -0.8  -21.4  6.0  26.0    -0.8  0.0  7.0  9.0 
Zimbabwe  -4.1  -31.0  7.0  49.0    -3.2  0.0  8.9  15.4 
Rest of Africa  -1.2  -4.2  19.0  13.4    -1.2  0.3  19.0  13.4 
East and South Asia  -2.4  -16.7  19.5  34.6    2.4  0.6  29.6  8.1 
China  -8.5  -38.7  6.9  46.1    0.0  0.2  6.5  7.1 
Korea  2.8  0.0  106.7  7.6    0.0  0.0  319.4  5.9 
Taiwan  -0.4  21.7  98.0  5.7    -0.4  0.0  84.2  3.9 
Indonesia  0.2  -3.1  27.9  28.0    0.0  -1.6  7.3  4.9 
Malasya  4.8  -0.2  3.1  5.2    0.0  -0.2  5.0  5.9 
Philippines  -4.7  -0.1  18.3  14.0    -4.7  0.0  7.1  3.4 
Thailand  -0.2  -0.7  29.8  19.1    -0.2  0.0  26.2  12.9 
Vietnam  -3.6  -0.5  21.5  18.5    -3.6  -0.5  21.5  18.5 
Bangladesh  -1.0  -2.2  10.6  26.7    -1.0  0.0  9.9  22.5 
India  4.9  -8.8  8.9  86.2    10.1  2.5  2.9  20.8 
Pakistan  0.7  -2.7  15.0  53.3    0.0  -0.2  19.4  18.5 
Sri Lanka  1.1  -14.1  22.1  53.1    0.6  -0.3  23.8  5.8 
Rest of East and South 
Asia  -0.7  0.0  4.3  2.7 
 
-0.7  0.0  4.3  2.7 
Latin America  3.8  -9.6  9.8  15.7    -0.2  -1.4  7.2  6.7 
Argentina  0.0  -20.9  0.0  15.8    0.0  -14.8  0.0  5.8 
Brazil  5.0  -17.1  3.2  33.4    0.0  0.0  4.8  8.9 
Chile  -3.0  0.0  4.8  6.2    0.0  0.0  2.4  1.8 
Colombia  -0.6  1.0  21.7  22.8    0.0  0.0  21.6  9.8 
Ecuador  0.0  -13.7  28.6  10.3    0.0  0.0  13.4  10.4 
Mexico  14.3  -9.6  19.1  6.8    1.2  0.0  6.2  3.4 
Nicaragua  0.0  -2.8  10.9  3.9    0.0  -2.8  9.6  3.9 
Rest of Latin America  -1.7  0.3  9.9  9.9    -1.7  0.3  9.9  9.9 
EEurope & Central Asia  0.8  -2.6  13.8  9.6    0.8  -0.3  15.9  4.8 
Baltic States  3.4  0.0  8.2  0.9    3.4  0.0  8.2  0.9 
Bulgary  0.6  0.0  14.8  11.5    0.6  0.0  14.8  11.5 
CZE Republic  0.6  0.0  3.0  0.5    0.6  0.0  3.0  0.5 
Hungary  3.1  0.0  6.2  0.5    3.1  0.0  6.2  0.5 
Poland  0.4  0.0  6.2  0.8    0.4  0.0  6.2  0.8 
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Table 1 (continued): Structure of price distortions in global goods markets drawn from 
the World Bank project,


























Subsidy  Tariff  Tariff 
                   
Romania  1.3  0.0  18.0  9.8    1.3  0.0  18.0  9.8 
Slovakia  0.0  0.0  5.2  0.4    0.0  0.0  5.2  0.4 
Slovenia  0.0  0.0  7.8  0.4    0.0  0.0  7.8  0.4 
Russia  1.7  -0.9  18.9  7.4    1.7  -0.9  18.9  7.4 
Kazakhstan  -0.9  0.0  3.4  2.7    -0.9  0.0  3.4  2.7 
Turkey  0.8  -14.3  20.4  43.9    0.8  0.0  33.3  3.1 
Rest of EEurope and 
CAsia  -1.1  -0.9  9.7  5.7 
 
-1.1  -0.9  9.7  5.7 
High-income countries  6.6  20.9  24.0  2.4    2.6  7.2  22.3  1.2 
Australia  0.5  7.0  6.7  8.9    0.0  0.0  0.5  3.3 
Canada  3.0  7.0  42.6  5.1    1.6  3.6  18.9  1.4 
EU15  1.2  28.6  13.3  2.0    1.2  12.8  6.9  0.7 
Japan  13.1  0.0  120.9  0.9    2.0  0.0  151.7  1.7 
New Zealand  -5.3  15.4  1.7  18.0    0.0  -0.2  0.7  3.3 
Rest West Europe  101.7  54.0  59.5  4.0    2.6  13.4  53.9  2.2 
USA  3.3  14.1  6.5  2.9    5.2  0.6  6.1  1.3 
Developing countries   -0.6  -11.0  16.4  25.6    1.4  0.0  21.8  7.5 
  Africa  -0.3  -2.5  17.0  12.6    -0.8  0.1  20.4  11.2 
  East Asia   -5.6  -21.5  24.3  29.6    -0.3  0.0  41.6  6.7 
  South Asia   3.5  -7.1  10.7  72.6    7.2  1.7  6.9  20.2 
  Latin America  3.8  -9.6  9.8  15.7    -0.2  -1.4  7.2  6.7 
  Middle East  -12.4  0.0  7.5  5.7    -12.4  0.0  7.5  5.7 
  EEurope and CAsia  0.8  -2.6  13.8  9.6    0.8  -0.3  15.9  4.8 
WORLD TOTAL  2.3  4.7  20.1  10.1    1.9  3.5  22.1  3.3 
 
 
a Using value of production at undistorted prices as weights. 
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 30 
 
Table 2: Economic welfare impact of going back to 1980-84 policies, by country/region 
 








just to change 
in terms of 
trade 
($billion) 
Total real income 




          
North and Sub Saharan Africa  -2.8  1.8  -0.5  (0.3) 
Egypt  -0.1  0.1  -0.2  (0.1) 
Madagascar  0.0  0.1  1.1  (2.0) 
Mozambique  -0.2  0.4  -3.7  (7.2) 
Nigeria  -0.2  -0.9  -0.5  (-2.0) 
Senegal  0.0  0.0  -1.2  (-1.2) 
South Africa  -2.6  -1.4  -1.8  (-0.9) 
Uganda  -0.1  0.4  -2.3  (6.3) 
Tanzania  -0.1  0.8  -1.1  (8.6) 
Zambia  0.0  0.1  -0.8  (2.8) 
Zimbabwe  -0.2  0.3  -8.7  (12.3) 
Rest of Africa  0.7  1.9  0.3  (0.7) 
East and South Asia  -72.3  26.4  -2.1  (0.8) 
China  -46.4  29.1  -3.5  (2.2) 
Korea  -6.9  -6.9  -1.4  (-1.4) 
Taiwan  -2.9  -3.1  -1.2  (-1.2) 
Indonesia  -3.5  1.3  -1.6  (0.6) 
Malaysia  0.5  -0.5  0.6  (-0.6) 
Philippines  0.1  1.4  0.2  (2.1) 
Thailand  -1.5  -0.5  -0.6  (-0.2) 
Vietnam  -0.3  -0.2  -0.8  (-0.5) 
Bangladesh  0.0  0.0  0.1  (0.0) 
India  -8.7  5.6  -1.7  (1.1) 
Pakistan  -1.2  0.6  -1.6  (0.7) 
Sri Lanka  -0.9  0.4  -5.8  (2.2) 
Rest of East and South Asia  -0.7  -0.9  -0.5  (-0.6) 
Latin America   -7.1  13.7  -0.4  (0.8) 
Argentina  -1.7  0.1  -1.4  (0.1) 
Brazil  -5.3  6.8  -1.2  (1.6) 
Chile  0.1  0.7  0.1  (1.0) 
Colombia  2.5  2.5  3.5  (3.5) 
Ecuador  -0.6  0.3  -2.5  (1.2) 
Mexico  -2.6  3.6  -0.5  (0.7) 
Nicaragua  0.0  0.0  0.6  (0.0) 
Rest of Latin America  0.5  -0.2  0.1  (-0.1) 
EEurope & Central Asia  6.5  7.1  0.5  (0.6) 
Baltic States  0.3  0.2  1.1  (0.7) 
Bulgaria  0.4  0.3  3.4  (2.6) 
Czech Republic  0.4  0.3  0.6  (0.4) 
Hungary  0.3  0.3  0.4  (0.4) 31 
 
Poland  0.4  0.3  0.3  (0.2) 
Romania  0.8  0.5  2.2  (1.4) 
Slovakia  0.1  0.1  0.5  (0.5) 
Slovenia  0.0  0.0  0.1  (0.0) 
Russia  3.7  1.5  0.8  (0.3) 
Kazakhstan  0.0  0.0  0.0  (0.0) 
Turkey  -4.4  1.6  -2.0  (0.7) 
Rest of EEurope & Central Asia  4.4  2.1  4.2  (2.0) 
High-income countries  -159.9  -50.8  -0.7  (-0.2) 
Australia  -2.4  -0.2  -0.5  (0.0) 
Canada  -4.6  1.6  -0.7  (0.2) 
EU 15  -63.0  -10.3  -0.8  (-0.1) 
Japan  -14.6  -20.3  -0.5  (-0.6) 
New Zealand  -2.5  -0.6  -3.6  (-0.8) 
Rest of Western Europe  -59.7  -15.9  -12.1  (-3.2) 
United States  -10.8  -2.6  -0.1  (0.0) 
Hong Kong and Singapore  -2.2  -2.6  -1.8  (-2.1) 
Developing countries  -73.1  49.3  -1.0  (0.7) 
North Africa  0.6  0.1  0.3  (0.0) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -3.4  1.7  -1.0  (0.5) 
East Asia   -61.5  19.9  -2.2  (0.7) 
South Asia  -10.8  6.5  -1.7  (1.0) 
Latin America   -7.1  13.7  -0.4  (0.8) 
Middle East  2.6  0.4  0.5  (0.1) 
EEurope & Central Asia  6.5  7.1  0.5  (0.6) 
High-income countries  -159.9  -50.8  -0.7  (-0.2) 
World total  -233.0  -1.5  -0.8  (0.0) 
 
a Numbers in parentheses refer to that due to terms of trade effects. 




Table 3: Impact of going back to 1980-84 policies on indexes of real
a export and import prices, by region 
(percent) 
















services  Total 
                    
Developing countries  0.6  0.4  0.4  -15.7  0.0  -1.3  16.3  0.4  1.7 
North Africa  1.6  0.5  0.6  -9.2  0.5  -0.9  10.7  0.1  1.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -12.8  -0.5  -2.1  -18.7  0.3  -1.8  5.9  -0.8  -0.3 
East Asia   -1.8  0.2  0.2  -7.1  -0.6  -1.1  5.4  0.8  1.3 
South Asia  6.6  5.5  5.6  -6.8  0.1  -0.8  13.4  5.5  6.4 
Latin America   5.4  0.5  1.1  -12.1  0.4  -0.5  17.5  0.2  1.6 
Middle East  -2.2  -0.6  -0.7  -25.6  0.3  -2.6  23.4  -0.9  1.9 
EEurope and Central Asia  3.9  0.4  0.6  -28.6  0.5  -1.8  32.5  -0.1  2.4 
High-income countries  -24.0  0.2  -1.7  -17.9  0.4  -0.8  -6.2  -0.2  -0.8 
World total  -17.6  0.3  -1.0  -17.0  0.3  -1.0  -0.6  0.0  0.0 
 
a Relative to the numeraire which in this version of the LINKAGE model is the price of high-income countries’ exports of manufactures. 
 





Table 4: Terms of trade’s contribution to real income changes from going back to 1980-84 
policies, by region 
 (2004 $billion) 
 
   Exports  Imports
















               
Developing countries  20,567  20,323  11,907  -3,458  49,340  -73,150 
North Africa  157  390  -10  -452  85  598 
Sub-Saharan Africa  2,359  -504  560  -696  1,719  -3,399 
East Asia and Pacific  5,395  7,948  877  5,684  19,905  -61,550 
South Asia  1,441  6,218  -818  -365  6,476  -10,761 
Latin America   9,562  5,296  1,681  -2,867  13,671  -7,125 
Middle East  -256  -1,560  3,545  -1,352  376  2,584 
EEurope & Central Asia  1,909  2,536  6,072  -3,409  7,108  6,504 
High-income countries  -65,099  12,403  32,558  -30,710  -50,847  -159,880 
World total  -44,532  32,726  44,465  -34,167  -1,508  -233,030 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations 34 
 
Table 5: Impact of going back to 1980-84 policies on shares of global output exported, and 
developing country shares of global output and exports,









share of global output 
Developing countries' 
share of global 
exports
a 
   Benchmark   1980-84  Benchmark   1980-84  Benchmark   1980-84 
                
Paddy rice  1  2  81  85  56  21 
Wheat  16  19  67  56  25  10 
Other grains  11  14  55  45  35  17 
Oil seeds  21  23  69  60  54  34 
Plant-based fibers  25  44  74  72  50  72 
Vegetables and fruits  9  8  72  69  69  56 
Other crops  14  12  49  45  75  62 
Cattle sheep etc  2  2  43  41  56  53 
Other livestock  4  6  65  57  43  41 
Wool  13  14  82  80  16  14 
Beef and sheep meat  7  6  27  26  31  24 
Other meat products  7  10  32  21  42  2 
Vegetable oils and fats  20  19  52  49  80  73 
Dairy products  5  8  29  31  28  54 
Processed rice  5  6  76  79  85  60 
Refined sugar  8  22  52  69  78  95 
Other food, beverages and 
tobacco  9  7  35  35  50  54 
Other primary products  31  30  64  65  76  78 
Textile and wearing 
apparel  28  23  53  50  74  71 
Other manufacturing  24  21  32  33  43  42 
Services  3  3  20  20  31  31 
Agriculture and food  8  9  46  44  54  48 
Primary agriculture  8  9  62  58  55  43 
Processed foods  8  9  37  36  52  51 
 
aexcluding intra-EU trade. 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations 35 
 
Table 6: Impact of going back to 1980-84 policies on agricultural and food output and trade, by 
country/region 
 
(relative to benchmark data, in 2004 billion US dollars and percent) 
   $billion 
Percent change relative to 
baseline 
   Output  Exports  Imports  Output  Exports  Imports 
              
North and Sub Saharan Africa  5.0  3.9  8.0  2.6  18.9  37.0 
Egypt  -0.4  -0.2  0.2  -2.6  -13.9  6.8 
Madagascar  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  12.1  22.6 
Mozambique  1.2  1.1  0.2  75.9  676.8  80.5 
Nigeria  -0.2  0.5  0.5  -1.1  115.5  33.3 
Senegal  0.2  0.2  0.1  9.6  125.0  9.8 
South Africa  8.4  6.4  0.6  30.8  192.1  32.3 
Uganda  0.0  -0.1  0.0  -1.0  -21.1  -14.9 
Tanzania  -0.3  -0.2  0.1  -5.0  -42.6  42.8 
Zambia  -0.3  -0.3  0.1  -18.6  -81.7  105.8 
Zimbabwe  -0.8  -0.7  0.1  -49.0  -77.5  40.9 
Rest of Africa  -2.8  -2.8  6.0  -2.5  -22.1  46.8 
East and South Asia  -42.4  -3.9  29.9  -4.6  -8.2  44.4 
China  -44.4  -5.8  23.6  -12.6  -57.8  96.3 
Korea  6.3  0.6  1.1  10.4  112.5  13.1 
Taiwan  1.8  2.1  0.5  8.7  440.3  12.8 
Indonesia  0.5  -0.6  -0.4  0.8  -7.8  -9.1 
Malaysia  1.8  1.7  1.1  9.8  22.0  28.3 
Philippines  0.3  0.0  0.4  0.9  0.1  16.2 
Thailand  -1.1  0.3  0.7  -2.0  4.5  27.4 
Vietnam  1.3  1.3  0.3  8.7  60.6  24.6 
Bangladesh  0.4  -0.1  -0.1  1.5  -39.4  -4.8 
India  -7.3  -2.6  1.3  -3.3  -38.2  22.7 
Pakistan  -1.3  -0.6  0.2  -3.0  -49.7  9.5 
Sri Lanka  -0.1  -0.5  0.0  -1.9  -62.4  -1.1 
Rest of East and South Asia  -0.5  0.3  1.3  -2.4  13.4  25.8 
Latin America and the Caribbean  -22.5  -13.8  6.5  -6.9  -20.6  26.8 
Argentina  -6.4  -5.8  0.1  -19.9  -36.7  27.8 
Brazil  -18.4  -12.4  0.7  -18.2  -48.5  30.7 
Chile  -1.1  -0.2  0.1  -11.0  -7.8  12.7 
Colombia  10.3  9.0  1.4  48.6  292.6  110.4 
Ecuador  -1.4  -1.6  -0.1  -15.6  -69.6  -12.7 
Mexico  -1.5  -2.9  1.2  -2.3  -54.0  12.6 
Nicaragua  0.0  0.1  0.0  2.8  26.1  16.8 
Rest of Latin America  -3.9  0.0  2.9  -4.6  -0.2  32.2 
EEurope & Central Asia  -10.3  11.6  23.9  -2.6  53.4  91.6 
Baltic States  -0.8  0.2  1.0  -11.3  18.6  75.3 
Bulgaria  4.3  1.9  0.4  6.8  266.2  71.2 
Czech Republic  -1.1  0.0  1.0  -6.3  2.5  57.0 
Hungary  -1.5  0.0  1.1  -10.9  0.3  88.8 
Poland  -3.3  -0.1  1.8  -7.3  -3.9  64.0 
Romania  -0.1  0.7  1.4  -0.5  101.6  101.6 36 
 
Slovakia  -0.4  0.0  0.3  -5.1  -0.3  53.6 
Slovenia  -0.1  0.1  0.2  -2.4  31.8  40.2 
Russia  -7.8  0.5  11.2  -8.0  28.5  126.3 
Kazakhstan  0.6  0.7  0.1  5.0  75.7  33.6 
Turkey  -2.6  -1.0  2.0  -4.2  -25.2  62.8 
Rest of EEurope & Central Asia  2.6  8.7  3.5  6.7  148.9  94.9 
High-income countries
a  195.8  256.1  183.7  11.0  110.8  78.3 
Australia  -1.2  0.0  1.3  -2.0  -0.2  80.9 
Canada  6.5  9.1  3.3  9.8  61.6  40.0 
EU 15
a  123.1  165.5  123.9  13.7  124.6  77.7 
Japan  -6.2  1.0  8.0  -3.6  230.5  32.9 
New Zealand  3.4  2.0  0.4  14.9  23.8  64.2 
Rest of Western Europe  74.7  69.1  30.1  125.3  1849.8  409.0 
United States  -4.4  9.4  15.9  -0.9  17.5  55.9 
Hong Kong and Singapore  -0.1  0.0  0.8  -2.5  38.9  17.9 
Developing countries  -62.8  8.1  80.5  -3.2  4.9  50.3 
North Africa  -0.4  1.2  2.1  -0.7  35.2  21.4 
Sub-Saharan Africa  5.5  2.7  5.9  4.3  15.5  50.0 
East Asia   -34.0  -0.1  28.4  -5.4  -0.2  51.2 
South Asia  -8.4  -3.8  1.4  -2.8  -41.2  12.3 
Latin America   -22.5  -13.8  6.5  -6.9  -20.6  26.8 
Middle East  7.3  10.3  12.2  7.1  154.2  58.6 
EEurope & Central Asia  -10.3  11.6  23.9  -2.6  53.4  91.6 
High-income countries  195.8  256.1  183.7  11.0  110.8  78.3 
World total
a  133.0  264.2  264.2  3.6  66.9  66.9 
a(excluding intra-EU trade.
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations 37 
 
Table 7: Impact of going back to 1980-84 policies on self sufficiency






countries  Africa 
Latin 
































                                         
Paddy rice  101  108  100  99  97  96  93  79  100  100  101  100  95  94 
Wheat  141  190  88  79  67  61  80  59  68  43  100  98  102  96 
Other grains  108  124  94  88  94  97  98  100  88  76  103  103  103  95 
Oil seeds  104  124  97  88  104  102  140  110  66  64  100  99  106  103 
Plant-based fibers  161  168  88  83  177  141  94  78  54  11  93  91  104  243 
Vegetables and fruits  90  94  105  103  108  107  153  134  102  100  99  100  99  98 
Other crops  90  94  113  107  138  115  143  122  110  115  104  103  90  91 
Cattle sheep etc  100  100  100  100  101  101  102  101  98  97  100  100  102  103 
Other livestock  101  98  100  102  101  103  101  104  99  99  100  100  99  106 
Wool  161  167  92  91  103  103  103  102  78  74  96  95  96  96 
Beef and sheep meat  101  106  97  95  96  94  108  104  83  86  126  110  95  89 
Other meat products  100  149  100  82  92  74  121  83  101  92  96  91  96  74 
Vegetable oils and fats  95  100  103  100  69  86  141  115  115  116  78  73  93  92 
Dairy products  103  101  94  102  76  80  97  100  78  77  99  99  102  109 
Processed rice  99  104  100  99  69  72  94  89  104  104  104  100  92  94 
Refined sugar  98  69  102  130  95  173  131  239  98  103  96  92  98  96 
Other food, bev. and tob.  99  99  103  103  101  100  108  107  105  107  106  104  100  100 
Other primary products  76  74  122  123  180  181  148  152  84  85  75  88  115  116 
Textile and wearing app.  81  86  123  119  98  104  104  106  144  134  144  129  101  105 
Other manufacturing  101  100  98  99  77  77  96  97  106  107  90  95  95  94 
Services  101  101  101  100  101  101  100  100  101  101  100  99  101  101 
Agriculture and food  100  104  101  100  100  100  112  109  100  97  100  99  99  99 
Agriculture  99  104  100  98  104  101  115  106  96  92  100  99  100  103 
Processed foods  100  104  101  101  94  98  110  110  104  104  100  97  99  96 
a Self sufficiency is defined as domestic production as a percentage of domestic consumption measured in value terms at fob prices. 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations 38 
 
Table 8: Impact of going back to 1980-84 policies on shares of production exported and of consumption imported by world, high-
income and developing countries, (percent) 
   Share of production exported  Share of consumption imported 
  High-income countries






benchmark   1980-84 
2004 
benchmark   1980-84   
2004 
benchmark   1980-84 
2004 
benchmark   1980-84 
Paddy rice  3  10  1  0    2  4  1  2 
Wheat  37  40  6  3    11  10  17  22 
Other grains  15  21  7  5    9  13  11  16 
Oil seeds  31  37  16  13    26  22  16  21 
Plant-based fibers  50  45  17  44    18  18  26  59 
Vegetables and fruits  10  12  9  7    18  16  4  4 
Other crops  7  8  21  16    16  13  11  10 
Cattle sheep etc  1  1  2  2    2  2  2  2 
Other livestock  6  8  3  4    6  9  3  3 
Wool  60  59  2  2    35  36  10  11 
Beef and sheep meat  6  6  7  5    5  4  10  11 
Other meat products  6  13  9  1    6  10  8  18 
Vegetable oils and fats  8  10  31  29    12  11  26  27 
Dairy products  5  6  4  14    2  7  10  12 
Processed rice  3  11  5  5    4  9  5  5 
Refined sugar  4  4  12  30    5  33  10  13 
Other food, bev. and tob.  7  5  12  11    8  6  9  8 
Other primary products  20  18  37  36    38  39  22  20 
Textile and wearing app.  15  13  39  33    30  25  23  19 
Other manufacturing  20  18  32  27    19  18  32  27 
Services  3  3  5  5    2  2  5  5 
Agriculture and food  7  8  9  10    8  8  8  10 
Agriculture  9  12  7  7    10  10  7  8 
Processed foods  6  7  12  12    7  7  10  11 
a Excluding intra-EU trade 
Source: Authors’ Linkage model simulations 39 
 
Table 9: Impact of going back to 1980-84 policies on shares of agricultural and food production 






benchmark   1980-84 
     
Developing countries  9.5  9.5 
North Africa  6.3  7.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa  13.8  13.5 
East Asia   8.4  7.7 
South Asia  3.7  2.4 
Latin America   18.1  16.3 
Middle East  7.4  14.2 
EEurope & Central Asia  6.8  9.1 
High-income countries  13.0  15.9 
World total
a   11.4  13.1 
World total (excluding intra-EU trade)  8.1  8.7 
 
a Including intra-EU trade 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations 40 
 
Table 10: Impact of going back to 1980-84 policies on real international product prices 
 
(percent relative to 2004 baseline) 
 
Paddy rice  -11.6 
Wheat  -15.4 
Other grains  -27.5 
Oil seeds  -8.6 
Sugar cane and beet  -0.5 
Plant-based fibers  0.8 
Vegetables and fruits  2.8 
Other crops  2.6 
Cattle sheep etc  0.5 
Other livestock  -2.0 
Raw milk  0.4 
Wool  -1.9 
Beef and sheep meat  -15.0 
Other meat products  -45.5 
Vegetable oils and fats  -1.4 
Dairy products  -8.5 
Processed rice  0.6 
Refined sugar  -2.5 
Other food, bevs. and tobacco  0.1 
Textile and wearing apparel  1.4 
Other manufacturing  0.3 
Merchandise trade  -1.2 
Agriculture and food  -12.6 
   Primary agriculture  -5.9 
   Agric & lightly processed food  -17.6 
 
Note: Model numéraire is the export price index of high-income countries' manufactured exports 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations 41 
 
Table 11: Impact of going back to 1980-84 policies on real factor prices,
a by country/region 
 



















              
Developing countries  -2.1  -1.7  -1.5  -4.1  1.0  0.4 
North Africa  0.3  0.1  -0.2  -1.1  0.3  -0.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.1  0.6  1.2  -1.5  -1.4  -3.1 
East Asia   -4.5  -3.7  -3.4  -6.2  0.7  1.9 
South Asia  -4.1  -4.7  -1.7  -6.6  5.4  4.7 
Latin America   0.0  -0.1  -0.2  -8.1  2.2  0.2 
Middle East  0.6  0.7  0.2  -4.3  -1.2  -3.9 
EEurope & Central Asia  0.2  -0.1  0.2  4.1  -0.2  -1.6 
High-income countries  0.4  -0.7  -0.4  102.1  -0.1  -1.2 
World total  -0.1  -0.9  -0.7  21.1  0.2  -0.5 
 
a 
Nominal factor prices deflated by national aggregate consumer price index (CPI), column 5 
b 
The user cost of capital and land represents the subsidy inclusive rental cost. 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations 
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Table 12: Impact of going back to 1980-84 policies on sectoral value added, agricultural and all-
sector policy changes  
 
(relative to 2004 benchmark data) 










   Agric 
Non-
agric  Agric 
Non-
agric  Agric 
Non-
agric  Agric 
Non-
agric 
                   
North and Sub Saharan Africa  -0.9  -0.2  -2.3  -0.6  -0.9  0.0  -2.2  -0.1 
Egypt  0.0  -0.7  -0.1  0.0  -0.1  -1.1  -0.8  0.1 
Madagascar  0.0  -0.1  0.1  0.0  -3.4  -3.1  7.1  1.0 
Mozambique  0.3  0.0  0.3  0.4  22.7  0.1  24.8  10.0 
Nigeria  -1.2  -0.8  -0.6  -0.8  -9.3  -1.7  -4.7  -1.6 
Senegal  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  -1.1  -0.8  9.0  -1.0 
South Africa  -0.1  0.1  1.6  -1.6  -0.7  0.1  20.3  -0.8 
Uganda  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -2.9  -1.6  -1.9  -2.1 
Tanzania  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  0.3  -0.3  -1.3  -1.3  4.2 
Zambia  0.0  0.0  -0.3  0.0  0.6  0.6  -28.2  0.3 
Zimbabwe  0.2  0.2  -0.3  -0.1  38.9  4.9  -62.7  -3.8 
Rest of Africa  0.0  1.4  -3.1  1.2  0.1  0.5  -4.9  0.4 
East and South Asia  2.0  100.7  -27.1  -65.2  0.5  2.9  -6.4  -1.9 
China  9.4  37.5  -27.0  -29.7  5.7  3.0  -16.3  -2.4 
Korea  -3.2  31.3  1.2  -24.9  -15.1  5.4  5.4  -4.3 
Taiwan  -0.5  10.1  0.8  -12.2  -9.9  3.7  17.6  -4.4 
Indonesia  0.2  2.7  0.4  -3.2  0.8  1.2  1.4  -1.5 
Malaysia  -0.1  4.0  0.3  -0.4  -2.0  3.8  12.9  -0.3 
Philippines  1.9  1.0  -0.6  -1.9  15.6  1.7  -4.6  -3.3 
Thailand  3.0  7.3  0.0  -6.3  14.3  2.8  -0.2  -2.4 
Vietnam  1.2  4.5  1.0  -1.2  18.8  15.6  15.8  -4.2 
Bangladesh  -0.3  -2.1  0.3  0.9  -3.8  -4.4  3.8  1.9 
India  -10.6  -1.3  -2.7  16.1  -8.3  -0.3  -2.1  3.5 
Pakistan  -0.1  0.2  -0.5  -0.1  -0.5  0.2  -2.8  -0.1 
Sri Lanka  0.3  1.3  -0.6  -1.0  7.1  9.6  -12.8  -7.4 
Rest of East and South Asia  0.7  4.3  0.3  -1.4  11.2  2.7  5.2  -0.9 
Latin America   40.7  34.6  -10.8  40.2  37.0  2.3  -9.8  2.7 
Argentina  10.9  15.1  -2.7  14.3  103.5  13.8  -25.5  13.1 
Brazil  13.0  21.3  -7.6  8.0  42.6  4.2  -24.9  1.6 
Chile  0.2  0.7  -0.1  1.0  5.5  0.9  -1.8  1.3 
Colombia  5.0  1.2  1.3  12.1  53.5  1.5  13.6  15.3 
Ecuador  2.9  1.7  -0.8  -0.5  126.0  6.7  -35.4  -1.9 
Mexico  0.1  -3.4  -0.9  6.3  0.3  -1.0  -4.0  1.8 
Nicaragua  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  2.4  2.3  5.1  -0.4 
Rest of Latin America  8.6  -2.1  0.0  -0.9  28.7  -0.6  0.0  -0.2 
EEurope & Central Asia  -6.2  4.4  1.7  -0.9  -5.2  0.3  1.5  -0.1 
Baltic States  -0.1  0.2  0.0  0.3  -8.9  0.5  0.5  0.9 
Bulgaria  0.4  0.1  0.4  0.6  5.6  0.3  5.6  3.4 
Czech Republic  -0.7  -0.3  0.0  0.8  -20.9  -0.3  -1.1  0.8 
Hungary  -0.7  -0.1  -0.3  0.8  -17.9  -0.1  -8.3  0.9 43 
 
Poland  -2.5  1.7  0.3  1.0  -22.6  0.9  2.5  0.5 
Romania  -0.5  0.3  0.1  1.1  -5.8  0.5  1.6  1.9 
Slovakia  -0.1  0.1  0.0  0.3  -13.5  0.4  0.3  0.8 
Slovenia  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  -11.1  0.4  11.8  0.4 
Russia  -2.3  -1.3  -0.8  -5.6  -6.6  -0.3  -2.3  -1.2 
Kazakhstan  0.5  0.5  0.1  0.1  23.0  1.2  5.0  0.4 
Turkey  -1.5  0.9  -3.1  0.4  -4.7  0.4  -9.5  0.2 
Rest of EEurope & C. Asia  1.5  2.1  5.0  -0.8  11.1  1.8  37.8  -0.7 
High-income countries  -58.5  28.6  144.2  -143.1  -14.7  0.1  36.2  -0.5 
Australia  2.7  11.7  0.2  -0.5  13.7  2.1  1.2  -0.1 
Canada  0.7  -4.6  5.9  2.8  5.3  -0.5  45.7  0.3 
EU 15  -47.4  -45.9  36.6  14.7  -25.4  -0.4  19.6  0.1 
Japan  -7.6  93.2  7.3  -149.3  -16.8  2.3  16.1  -3.7 
New Zealand  2.7  4.4  0.5  0.8  57.2  5.4  9.8  0.9 
Rest of Western Europe  -3.6  -8.4  88.3  -25.8  -25.8  -1.3  631.3  -4.0 
United States  -6.0  -25.2  5.3  17.6  -5.3  -0.2  4.6  0.2 
Hong Kong and Singapore  0.0  3.4  0.1  -3.4  2.2  2.1  10.3  -2.1 
Developing countries  44.4  145.6  -38.8  -32.1  5.6  1.9  -4.9  -0.4 
North Africa  -0.3  1.8  -0.1  0.7  -1.1  0.8  -0.3  0.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.6  -2.0  -2.2  -1.3  -0.8  -0.5  -3.1  -0.3 
East Asia   12.6  102.8  -23.6  -81.4  4.7  3.5  -8.9  -2.8 
South Asia  -10.7  -2.1  -3.5  16.2  -6.7  -0.3  -2.2  2.7 
Latin America   40.7  34.6  -10.8  40.2  37.0  2.3  -9.8  2.7 
Middle East  8.9  6.1  -0.4  -5.7  25.4  0.9  -1.1  -0.8 
EEurope & Central Asia  -6.2  4.4  1.7  -0.9  -5.2  0.3  1.5  -0.1 
World total  -14.2  174.2  105.4  -175.2  -1.2  0.5  8.8  -0.5 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations 44 
 
Table 13: Impact on real income of full liberalization of global merchandise trade, by 
country/region, 2004 
 







income due just 
to change in 
terms of trade 
($billion) 
Total real 




          
North and Sub Saharan Africa  0.9  -6.0  0.2  (-1.1) 
Egypt  -0.2  -0.6  -0.3  (-0.9) 
Madagascar  0.0  0.0  -0.9  (-1.2) 
Mozambique  0.1  -0.1  2.4  (-2.0) 
Nigeria  0.3  -0.6  0.7  (-1.3) 
Senegal  0.0  -0.1  -2.3  (-4.0) 
South Africa  0.2  -0.7  0.1  (-0.5) 
Uganda  0.0  0.0  -0.6  (-0.1) 
Tanzania  0.0  0.0  -0.5  (-0.4) 
Zambia  0.0  0.0  0.1  (-0.3) 
Zimbabwe  0.1  0.0  3.4  (0.5) 
Rest of Africa  0.5  -3.8  0.2  (-1.5) 
East and South Asia  29.7  -4.9  0.9  (-0.1) 
China  3.3  0.5  0.2  (0.0) 
Korea  14.0  0.2  2.8  (0.0) 
Taiwan  1.0  0.0  0.4  (0.0) 
Indonesia  0.5  0.0  0.2  (0.0) 
Malaysia  4.2  -1.0  4.7  (-1.1) 
Philippines  0.0  -0.5  0.1  (-0.7) 
Thailand  3.3  -0.1  1.4  (-0.1) 
Vietnam  1.9  -0.9  5.3  (-2.5) 
Bangladesh  -0.2  -0.8  -0.4  (-1.7) 
India  -0.8  -2.9  -0.2  (-0.6) 
Pakistan  -0.1  -0.6  -0.2  (-0.8) 
Sri Lanka  0.8  0.5  5.1  (3.1) 
Rest of East and South Asia  1.9  0.8  1.4  (0.5) 
Latin America   15.8  2.5  1.0  (0.2) 
Argentina  3.2  -0.7  2.6  (-0.6) 
Brazil  6.8  5.6  1.6  (1.3) 
Chile  0.3  0.2  0.4  (0.3) 
Colombia  2.2  0.7  3.1  (1.0) 
Ecuador  2.0  1.1  8.2  (4.4) 
Mexico  -0.7  -3.4  -0.1  (-0.6) 
Nicaragua  0.0  0.0  1.3  (0.4) 
Rest of Latin America  2.0  -1.0  0.5  (-0.3) 
EEurope & Central Asia  14.2  -3.6  1.2  (-0.3) 
Baltic States  0.5  0.1  1.8  (0.3) 
Bulgaria  0.2  -0.2  1.4  (-1.4) 
Czech Republic  1.0  -0.1  1.4  (-0.2) 
Hungary  0.4  -0.1  0.6  (-0.1) 45 
 
Poland  2.0  0.1  1.2  (0.1) 
Romania  -0.1  -0.7  -0.3  (-1.9) 
Slovakia  0.7  0.1  2.3  (0.4) 
Slovenia  0.3  0.1  1.5  (0.3) 
Russia  5.4  -3.1  1.2  (-0.7) 
Kazakhstan  0.4  0.2  1.1  (0.6) 
Turkey  1.3  -0.5  0.6  (-0.2) 
Rest of EEurope & Central Asia  2.2  0.5  2.1  (0.4) 
High-income countries  102.8  11.3  0.5  (0.1) 
Australia  2.4  1.9  0.5  (0.4) 
Canada  0.6  -1.2  0.1  (-0.2) 
EU 15  56.8  -3.8  0.7  (0.0) 
Japan  23.1  10.4  0.7  (0.3) 
New Zealand  2.2  1.8  3.2  (2.6) 
Rest of Western Europe  13.1  -0.1  2.7  (0.0) 
United States  2.8  0.9  0.0  (0.0) 
Hong Kong and Singapore  1.7  1.4  1.4  (1.1) 
Developing countries  64.9  -12.2  0.9  (-0.2) 
North Africa  0.9  -2.8  0.5  (-1.5) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.0  -3.2  0.0  (-0.9) 
East Asia   30.1  -1.0  1.1  (0.0) 
South Asia  -0.4  -3.9  -0.1  (-0.6) 
Latin America   15.8  2.5  1.0  (0.2) 
Middle East  4.2  -0.2  0.8  (0.0) 
EEurope & Central Asia  14.2  -3.6  1.2  (-0.3) 
World total  167.7  -1.0  0.6  (0.0) 
 
a Numbers in parentheses refer to that due to terms of trade effects. 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations 46 
 
Table 14: Regional and sectoral sources of welfare gains from full liberalization of global 
merchandise trade, 2004 
 
(relative to the 2004 benchmark data in 2004 US dollars and percent) 
 
   Gains
a by region in $billion  Percent of regional gain
b 
              
   Developing 
High-
income  World  Developing 
High-
income  World 
              
Developing countries liberalize:              
Agriculture and light processing  35.6  4.7  40.3  30.1  9.4  24.0 
Manufacturing and services  6.0  51.5  57.5  5.1  103.9  34.3 
Total  41.6  56.2  97.7  35.2  113.3  58.3 
              
High-income countries liberalize:              
Agriculture and light processing  62.6  -2.0  60.6  53.0  -4.0  36.1 
Manufacturing and services  13.9  -4.6  9.3  11.8  -9.3  5.6 
Total  76.5  -6.6  69.9  64.8  -13.3  41.7 
              
All countries liberalize:              
Agriculture and light processing  98.2  2.7  100.9  83.1  5.4  60.1 
Manufacturing and services  19.9  46.9  66.8  16.9  94.6  39.9 
Total  118.1  49.6  167.7  70.4  29.6  100 
 
a Small interaction effects are distributed proportionately and numbers are rounded to sum to 100 percent 
b Percentage in last row refers to the total regional gain relative to the world total. 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations 47 
 
Table 15: Impact of full global liberalization on shares of global output exported, and developing 
country shares of global output and exports,









share of global output 
Developing countries' 
share of global 
exports
a 
   Benchmark 
Full Global 
liberalization  Benchmark 
Full Global 
liberalization  Benchmark 
Full Global 
liberalization 
                
Paddy rice  1  2  81  82  56  42 
Wheat  16  22  67  71  25  39 
Other grains  11  15  55  57  35  56 
Oil seeds  21  28  69  74  54  68 
Plant-based fibers  25  25  74  83  50  79 
Vegetables and fruits  9  15  72  77  69  80 
Other crops  14  17  49  49  75  62 
Cattle sheep etc  2  2  43  48  56  59 
Other livestock  4  4  65  67  43  46 
Wool  13  14  82  81  16  18 
Beef and sheep meat  7  21  27  41  31  68 
Other meat products  7  12  32  34  42  45 
Vegetable oils and fats  20  30  52  58  80  84 
Dairy products  5  11  29  33  28  41 
Processed rice  5  7  76  79  85  87 
Refined sugar  8  42  52  85  78  90 
Other food, beverages and 
tobacco  9  12  35  36  50  59 
Other primary products  31  33  64  63  76  76 
Textile and wearing apparel  28  35  53  57  74  77 
Other manufacturing  24  26  32  31  43  43 
Services  3  3  20  20  31  30 
Agriculture and food  8  13  46  50  54  64 
Agriculture  8  11  62  65  55  64 
Processed foods  8  14  37  40  52  63 
 
aexcluding intra-EU trade. 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations 48 
 
Table 16: Impacts of full global trade liberalization on agricultural and food output and trade, by 
country/region, 2004 
 
(relative to 2004 benchmark data, in 2004 billion US dollars and percent) 
   $billion 
Percent change relative to 
baseline 
   Output  Exports  Imports  Output  Exports  Imports 
              
North and Sub Saharan Africa  13.8  20.5  10.0  7.2  99.1  46.0 
Egypt  0.4  0.5  -0.1  2.2  39.2  -4.2 
Madagascar  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.4  2.7  -4.3 
Mozambique  0.9  1.0  0.1  52.3  597.1  33.3 
Nigeria  -0.5  0.4  0.7  -2.9  92.8  43.1 
Senegal  0.0  0.0  0.0  -1.9  35.0  0.3 
South Africa  0.7  0.9  0.8  2.4  26.7  42.9 
Uganda  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.6  1.3  1.5 
Tanzania  0.0  0.2  0.1  -0.7  28.5  31.2 
Zambia  0.1  0.1  0.0  5.2  22.3  35.9 
Zimbabwe  0.4  0.3  0.1  25.7  38.0  39.2 
Rest of Africa  12.0  17.0  8.3  10.5  133.1  64.3 
East and South Asia  25.0  39.5  24.7  2.7  83.4  36.7 
China  6.2  7.7  6.7  1.7  76.5  27.5 
Korea  -1.0  1.0  6.2  -1.7  194.1  75.0 
Taiwan  -1.9  0.3  1.5  -9.1  62.8  35.5 
Indonesia  1.1  1.6  1.0  1.8  21.6  21.5 
Malaysia  1.6  1.3  0.7  8.9  17.0  17.8 
Philippines  1.1  1.9  0.8  3.5  120.5  35.0 
Thailand  9.5  8.3  1.9  17.4  133.0  78.1 
Vietnam  0.5  1.1  0.6  3.3  54.0  55.6 
Bangladesh  -0.6  0.4  0.8  -2.4  261.2  38.3 
India  1.1  9.0  1.4  0.5  131.2  24.2 
Pakistan  -0.6  0.5  1.0  -1.3  45.0  43.0 
Sri Lanka  -0.1  -0.1  0.6  -1.2  -18.2  69.3 
Rest of East and South Asia  8.0  6.4  1.4  41.5  266.1  29.5 
Latin America   87.2  71.5  7.2  26.8  106.4  29.8 
Argentina  12.2  15.1  0.3  37.8  95.6  81.8 
Brazil  45.8  25.7  2.1  45.3  100.7  94.8 
Chile  0.5  0.4  0.2  4.7  11.3  15.8 
Colombia  3.1  4.9  1.1  14.6  161.4  81.7 
Ecuador  4.2  4.6  0.3  46.1  198.7  71.8 
Mexico  -0.3  0.3  0.4  -0.4  5.8  4.3 
Nicaragua  0.0  0.1  0.0  2.9  21.6  19.4 
Rest of Latin America  21.6  20.4  2.8  25.7  175.9  30.4 
EEurope & Central Asia  -10.4  17.4  20.3  -2.6  79.7  77.6 
Baltic States  -1.2  -0.1  0.4  -16.9  -15.5  30.9 
Bulgaria  4.2  2.6  0.6  6.6  366.5  118.1 
Czech Republic  -2.2  -0.1  0.7  -12.0  -10.9  40.5 
Hungary  -0.9  0.4  0.8  -6.0  17.1  66.6 
Poland  1.7  2.5  2.5  3.9  80.7  88.8 
Romania  -0.2  1.3  1.1  -1.0  190.5  78.3 49 
 
Slovakia  -0.9  -0.1  0.4  -11.3  -12.0  64.1 
Slovenia  -0.6  -0.1  0.2  -17.1  -54.1  26.2 
Russia  -12.9  3.2  8.8  -13.1  179.4  98.9 
Kazakhstan  1.5  1.4  0.0  11.8  142.9  11.6 
Turkey  -2.0  2.3  2.9  -3.1  61.5  92.1 
Rest of EEurope & Central Asia  3.0  4.1  2.0  7.7  71.3  53.4 
High-income countries  -233.2  -9.2  89.8  -13.1  -4.0  38.3 
Australia  12.0  7.0  0.2  19.8  41.2  11.1 
Canada  -1.6  3.6  2.7  -2.4  24.1  32.8 
EU 15  -190.9  -38.8  50.9  -21.2  -29.2  31.9 
Japan  -39.1  0.4  16.8  -22.9  87.7  69.1 
New Zealand  10.6  6.4  0.2  46.6  74.3  27.1 
Rest of Western Europe  -11.6  11.7  9.8  -19.4  312.0  132.7 
United States  -12.8  0.6  9.3  -2.6  1.1  32.4 
Hong Kong and Singapore  0.1  0.0  0.1  2.1  6.3  1.6 
Developing countries  137.6  163.6  64.6  7.1  100.0  40.4 
North Africa  11.4  13.3  6.1  17.3  377.2  62.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa  2.5  7.2  3.8  1.9  41.9  32.3 
East Asia   25.1  29.5  20.8  4.0  77.4  37.4 
South Asia  -0.1  10.0  3.9  0.0  108.3  33.2 
Latin America   87.2  71.5  7.2  26.8  106.4  29.8 
Middle East  22.0  14.8  2.5  21.5  222.7  12.1 
EEurope & Central Asia  -10.4  17.4  20.3  -2.6  79.7  77.6 
World total  -95.7  154.4  154.4  -2.6  39.1  39.1 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations 50 
 
Table 17: Impact of global liberalization on share of agricultural and food production exported 










     
Developing countries  9.5  16.9 
North Africa  6.3  20.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa  13.8  19.3 
East Asia   8.4  15.1 
South Asia  3.7  7.5 
Latin America   18.1  28.2 
Middle East  7.4  17.2 
EEurope & Central Asia  6.8  11.1 
High-income countries  13.0  14.1 
World total  11.4  15.4 
 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations 51 
 
Table 18: Impact of global liberalization on self sufficiency










America   East Asia   South Asia 
EEurope & 
Central Asia 
   Benchmark 
Global 
lib  Benchmark 
Global 
lib  Benchmark 
Global 
lib  Benchmark 
Global 
lib  Benchmark 
Global 
lib  Benchmark 
Global 
lib  Benchmark 
Global 
lib 
                                         
Paddy rice  101  105  100  99  97  96  93  72  100  101  101  101  95  92 
Wheat  141  140  88  89  67  46  80  98  68  65  100  98  102  117 
Other grains  108  102  94  98  94  91  98  119  88  81  103  105  103  113 
Oil seeds  104  92  97  103  104  130  140  167  66  51  100  101  106  115 
Plant-based fibers  161  112  88  97  177  265  94  107  54  58  93  95  104  118 
Vegetables and fruits  90  78  105  109  108  103  153  221  102  104  99  98  99  92 
Other crops  90  91  113  110  138  138  143  133  110  104  104  104  90  88 
Cattle sheep etc  100  100  100  100  101  99  102  102  98  97  100  100  102  102 
Other livestock  101  101  100  100  101  100  101  100  99  99  100  100  99  98 
Wool  161  180  92  91  103  104  103  102  78  75  96  93  96  99 
Beef and sheep meat  101  85  97  134  96  102  108  183  83  77  126  652  95  85 
Other meat products  100  99  100  103  92  85  121  143  101  103  96  95  96  93 
Vegetable oils and fats  95  85  103  114  69  191  141  143  115  116  78  66  93  96 
Dairy products  103  100  94  101  76  79  97  102  78  78  99  99  102  104 
Processed rice  99  95  100  101  69  63  94  85  104  108  104  104  92  87 
Refined sugar  98  41  102  133  95  100  131  227  98  196  96  91  98  70 
Other food, bev. and tob.  99  97  103  105  101  100  108  112  105  113  106  94  100  98 
Other primary products  76  76  122  122  180  189  148  155  84  82  75  69  115  116 
Textile and wearing app.  81  76  123  128  98  91  104  91  144  155  144  153  101  95 
Other manufacturing  101  102  98  96  77  74  96  91  106  105  90  89  95  95 
Services  101  101  101  101  101  102  100  100  101  100  100  101  101  101 
Agriculture and food  100  95  101  105  100  103  112  126  100  102  100  100  99  98 
Agriculture  99  96  100  102  104  103  115  126  96  95  100  100  100  101 
Processed foods  100  95  101  108  94  103  110  126  104  111  100  101  99  96 
a Self sufficiency is defined as domestic production as a percentage of domestic consumption measured in value terms at fob prices. 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations 52 
 
Table 19: Share of production exported and of consumption imported by world, high-income and developing countries, before and 
after full global liberalization of all merchandise trade, by product, 2004 
(percent) 
   Share of production exported  Share of consumption imported 
  High-income countries
a  Developing countries  High-income countries
a  Developing countries 
  
2004 
benchmark  Global lib. 
2004 
benchmark  Global lib. 
2004 
 benchmark  Global lib. 
2004 
benchmark  Global lib. 
Paddy rice  3  7  1  1  2  3  1  2 
Wheat  37  47  6  12  11  25  17  21 
Other grains  15  16  7  15  9  14  11  15 
Oil seeds  31  34  16  25  26  36  16  22 
Plant-based fibers  50  31  17  24  18  22  26  25 
Vegetables and fruits  10  13  9  15  18  30  4  7 
Other crops  7  13  21  22  16  20  11  14 
Cattle sheep etc  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Other livestock  6  7  3  3  6  6  3  3 
Wool  60  62  2  3  35  31  10  12 
Beef and sheep meat  6  11  7  35  5  24  10  13 
Other meat products  6  10  9  16  6  12  8  14 
Vegetable oils and fats  8  11  31  43  12  24  26  34 
Dairy products  5  10  4  14  2  10  10  14 
Processed rice  3  4  5  8  4  9  5  7 
Refined sugar  4  30  12  44  5  66  10  25 
Other food, bev. and tob.  7  8  12  20  8  10  9  16 
Other primary products  20  21  37  39  38  39  22  24 
Textile and wearing app.  15  19  39  48  30  37  23  31 
Other manufacturing  20  21  32  36  19  20  32  38 
Services  3  3  5  4  2  2  5  5 
Agriculture and food  7  9  9  17  8  13  8  12 
Agriculture  9  11  7  11  10  15  7  9 
Processed foods  6  9  12  23  7  13  10  16 
a Excluding intra-EU trade 
Source: Authors’ Linkage model simulations 53 
 
Table 20: Impact of full global liberalization on real international product prices, 2004 
 








     
Paddy rice  6.9  6.6 
Wheat  1.8  1.4 
Other grains  2.6  2.7 
Oil seeds  -2.2  -2.4 
Sugar cane and beet  -1.1  -2.0 
Plant-based fibers  4.7  2.9 
Vegetables and fruits  2.4  1.8 
Other crops  1.7  1.0 
Cattle sheep etc  -0.2  -1.1 
Other livestock  -1.2  -2.1 
Raw milk  0.7  -0.2 
Wool  3.5  3.3 
Beef and sheep meat  5.6  4.6 
Other meat products  1.3  0.6 
Vegetable oils and fats  -1.4  -1.9 
Dairy products  4.6  3.8 
Processed rice  2.8  2.9 
Refined sugar  2.5  1.3 
Other food, beverages and tobacco  -1.7  -1.3 
Textile and wearing apparel  0.3  -1.2 
Other manufacturing  0.2  -0.2 
Merchandise trade  0.3  -0.2 
Agriculture and food  0.8  0.3 
    Agriculture  1.5  0.9 
    Agriculture and light processing  2.0  1.3 
 
Note: Model numéraire is the export price index of high-income countries' manufactured 
exports 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations 54 
 





















              
Developing countries  3.5  3.0  2.9  1.6  -0.9  -2.8 
North Africa  7.0  7.7  5.3  -0.5  -5.2  -7.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa  3.2  3.2  3.8  0.2  -3.8  -4.9 
East Asia   4.0  3.4  3.3  1.9  0.1  -2.7 
South Asia  -0.6  2.3  1.2  -6.2  -1.6  0.3 
Latin America   4.5  1.4  1.9  21.1  1.2  3.2 
Middle East  8.3  2.9  4.7  43.8  -3.3  -10.5 
EEurope & Central Asia  1.7  3.2  2.6  -4.5  -2.3  -4.5 
High-income countries  0.2  1.0  0.5  -17.9  -0.6  -3.6 
World total  0.9  1.3  1.2  -3.1  -0.7  -3.2 
 
a Nominal factor prices deflated by national aggregate consumer price index (CPI), 
column 5 
b The user cost of capital and land represents the subsidy inclusive rental cost. 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations 55 
 
Table 22: Effects of full global liberalization and own-liberalization of agricultural and 
other merchandise trade on sectoral value added, by region's policies  
 




billion US dollars  Percent 











agric  Agric 
Non-
agric  Agric 
Non-
agric  Agric 
Non-
agric 
                   
North and Sub Saharan Africa  0.1  5.1  -0.9  -0.2  0.1  0.8  -0.9  0.0 
Egypt  0.1  0.2  0.0  -0.7  1.3  0.4  -0.1  -1.1 
Madagascar  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  -3.2  0.1  -3.4  -3.1 
Mozambique  0.3  0.0  0.3  0.0  23.6  0.6  22.7  0.1 
Nigeria  -0.6  0.2  -1.2  -0.8  -4.8  0.5  -9.3  -1.7 
Senegal  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.5  -0.8  -1.1  -0.8 
South Africa  -0.2  0.7  -0.1  0.1  -2.7  0.4  -0.7  0.1 
Uganda  -0.1  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -1.6  -0.4  -2.9  -1.6 
Tanzania  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.6  -0.3  -0.3  -1.3 
Zambia  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.5  0.6  0.6 
Zimbabwe  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.2  24.2  0.8  38.9  4.9 
Rest of Africa  0.5  3.9  0.0  1.4  0.7  1.4  0.1  0.5 
East and South Asia  -1.4  24.4  2.0  100.7  -0.3  0.7  0.5  2.9 
China  4.6  2.5  9.4  37.5  2.8  0.2  5.7  3.0 
Korea  -4.0  7.2  -3.2  31.3  -18.7  1.2  -15.1  5.4 
Taiwan  -0.5  0.8  -0.5  10.1  -11.3  0.3  -9.9  3.7 
Indonesia  0.3  1.1  0.2  2.7  1.1  0.5  0.8  1.2 
Malaysia  -0.2  0.9  -0.1  4.0  -6.3  0.8  -2.0  3.8 
Philippines  1.7  0.3  1.9  1.0  13.8  0.5  15.6  1.7 
Thailand  2.9  2.7  3.0  7.3  14.0  1.0  14.3  2.8 
Vietnam  1.4  0.0  1.2  4.5  22.8  0.0  18.8  15.6 
Bangladesh  -0.2  0.4  -0.3  -2.1  -2.6  0.9  -3.8  -4.4 
India  -7.8  6.3  -10.6  -1.3  -6.1  1.4  -8.3  -0.3 
Pakistan  -0.2  -0.1  -0.1  0.2  -1.0  -0.1  -0.5  0.2 
Sri Lanka  0.0  0.0  0.3  1.3  0.0  0.1  7.1  9.6 
Rest of East and South Asia  0.6  2.3  0.7  4.3  9.6  1.4  11.2  2.7 
Latin America   40.0  42.2  40.7  34.6  36.3  2.8  37.0  2.3 
Argentina  12.4  8.1  10.9  15.1  116.8  7.4  103.5  13.8 
Brazil  12.2  22.7  13.0  21.3  40.1  4.4  42.6  4.2 
Chile  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.7  5.0  0.3  5.5  0.9 
Colombia  5.0  2.1  5.0  1.2  53.5  2.7  53.5  1.5 
Ecuador  2.6  2.9  2.9  1.7  113.1  11.4  126.0  6.7 
Mexico  -0.2  0.6  0.1  -3.4  -1.0  0.2  0.3  -1.0 
Nicaragua  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  3.0  1.4  2.4  2.3 
Rest of Latin America  7.9  5.5  8.6  -2.1  26.3  1.5  28.7  -0.6 
EEurope & Central Asia  -5.2  4.4  -6.2  4.4  -4.4  0.3  -5.2  0.3 
Baltic States  -0.1  0.1  -0.1  0.2  -7.5  0.3  -8.9  0.5 
Bulgaria  0.3  -0.1  0.4  0.1  5.1  -0.4  5.6  0.3 
Czech Republic  -0.7  0.4  -0.7  -0.3  -19.2  0.4  -20.9  -0.3 56 
 
Hungary  -0.7  0.3  -0.7  -0.1  -16.8  0.4  -17.9  -0.1 
Poland  -2.4  2.1  -2.5  1.7  -21.8  1.1  -22.6  0.9 
Romania  -0.3  0.2  -0.5  0.3  -3.7  0.4  -5.8  0.5 
Slovakia  -0.1  0.1  -0.1  0.1  -11.8  0.2  -13.5  0.4 
Slovenia  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  -9.2  0.4  -11.1  0.4 
Russia  -2.2  -0.7  -2.3  -1.3  -6.3  -0.2  -6.6  -0.3 
Kazakhstan  0.5  0.4  0.5  0.5  23.1  1.1  23.0  1.2 
Turkey  -1.0  0.9  -1.5  0.9  -3.2  0.4  -4.7  0.4 
Rest of EEurope & Central Asia  1.5  0.5  1.5  2.1  11.1  0.4  11.1  1.8 
High-income countries  -55.1  61.9  -58.5  28.6  -13.8  0.2  -14.7  0.1 
Australia  2.2  8.4  2.7  11.7  10.9  1.5  13.7  2.1 
Canada  0.4  2.5  0.7  -4.6  3.4  0.3  5.3  -0.5 
EU 15  -42.9  16.7  -47.4  -45.9  -23.0  0.2  -25.4  -0.4 
Japan  -7.6  4.5  -7.6  93.2  -16.7  0.1  -16.8  2.3 
New Zealand  2.7  4.1  2.7  4.4  57.7  5.0  57.2  5.4 
Rest of Western Europe  -3.6  6.5  -3.6  -8.4  -25.8  1.0  -25.8  -1.3 
United States  -6.4  18.6  -6.0  -25.2  -5.7  0.2  -5.3  -0.2 
Hong Kong and Singapore  0.0  0.6  0.0  3.4  3.7  0.4  2.2  2.1 
Developing countries  42.7  79.5  44.4  145.6  5.4  1.0  5.6  1.9 
North Africa  -0.1  3.9  -0.3  1.8  -0.4  1.8  -1.1  0.8 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.2  1.2  -0.6  -2.0  0.3  0.3  -0.8  -0.5 
East Asia   6.8  17.7  12.6  102.8  2.6  0.6  4.7  3.5 
South Asia  -8.2  6.7  -10.7  -2.1  -5.1  1.1  -6.7  -0.3 
Latin America   40.0  42.2  40.7  34.6  36.3  2.8  37.0  2.3 
Middle East  9.2  3.3  8.9  6.1  26.3  0.5  25.4  0.9 
EEurope & Central Asia  -5.2  4.4  -6.2  4.4  -4.4  0.3  -5.2  0.3 
World total  -12.4  141.4  -14.2  174.2  -1.0  0.4  -1.2  0.5 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations 57 
 
Appendix Table A: Protection structure
a in GTAP version 7p5 and in the distortion 
rates drawn from the World Bank project, 2004                                        
(percent) 
 
GTAP version 7p5 
   























Subsidy  Tariff  Tariff 
Australia  0.0  0.0  0.7  3.3    0.0  0.0  0.5  3.3 
New Zealand  0.0  0.0  2.8  3.3    0.0  -0.2  0.7  3.3 
EU15  1.0  10.8  7.1  0.7    1.2  12.8  6.9  0.7 
Rest West Europe  2.6  8.6  52.9  2.2    2.6  13.4  53.9  2.2 
Russia  1.7  -0.1  7.5  7.4    1.7  -0.9  18.9  7.4 
Kazakhstan  -0.9  0.0  2.9  2.7    -0.9  0.0  3.4  2.7 
Kyrgystan  -1.0  -0.1  3.1  5.0    -1.0  -0.1  3.8  5.0 
Turkey  0.8  0.0  29.0  3.1    0.8  0.0  33.3  3.1 
RestECA  -1.1  0.0  9.8  5.7    -1.1  -0.9  9.9  5.7 
Bulgary  0.6  0.0  17.0  11.5    0.6  0.0  14.8  11.5 
CZE Republic  0.6  10.2  3.1  0.5    0.6  0.0  3.0  0.5 
Estonia  0.0  9.7  6.2  0.9    0.0  0.0  5.0  0.9 
Hungary  3.1  9.7  6.6  0.5    3.1  0.0  6.2  0.5 
Latvia  13.1  9.9  3.7  0.9    13.3  0.0  3.3  0.9 
Lituania  0.5  9.4  13.1  1.0    0.5  0.0  12.1  1.0 
Poland  0.4  8.3  6.1  0.8    0.4  0.0  6.2  0.8 
Romania  1.3  0.0  19.8  9.8    1.3  0.0  18.0  9.8 
Slovakia  0.0  10.4  5.5  0.4    0.0  0.0  5.2  0.4 
Slovenia  0.0  10.5  6.3  0.4    0.0  0.0  7.8  0.4 
USA  4.0  0.5  2.5  1.3    5.2  0.6  6.1  1.3 
Canada  1.6  2.0  23.1  1.4    1.6  3.6  18.9  1.4 
Japan  2.0  0.0  141.1  1.7    2.0  0.0  151.7  1.7 
Korea  0.0  0.0  172.7  5.9    0.0  0.0  319.4  5.9 
Taiwan  -0.4  0.0  77.4  3.9    -0.4  0.0  84.2  3.9 
OthHYC  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0    0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
China  0.0  0.0  12.6  7.1    0.0  0.2  6.5  7.1 
Indonesia  0.0  0.0  6.4  4.9    0.0  -1.6  7.3  4.9 
Malasya  0.0  0.0  2.4  5.9    0.0  -0.2  5.0  5.9 
Philippines  -4.7  0.0  20.0  3.4    -4.7  0.0  7.1  3.4 
Thailand  -0.2  0.0  22.1  12.9    -0.2  0.0  26.2  12.9 
Vietnam  -3.6  0.0  15.5  18.5    -3.6  -0.5  21.5  18.5 
Bangladesh  -1.0  0.0  16.3  22.5    -1.0  0.0  9.9  22.5 
India  3.9  0.0  29.8  20.9    10.1  2.5  2.9  20.8 
Pakistan  0.0  0.0  10.8  18.5    0.0  -0.2  19.4  18.5 
Sri Lanka  0.6  0.2  24.3  5.8    0.6  -0.3  23.8  5.8 
Rest Sasia  -0.5  0.0  5.0  15.6    -0.5  0.0  6.9  15.6 
Rest Easia  -0.7  0.0  2.8  2.3    -0.7  0.0  3.2  2.3 
RestME  -12.4  0.0  9.0  5.7    -12.4  0.0  7.5  5.7 
Egypt  0.0  0.0  4.0  13.5    0.0  0.0  5.0  13.5 
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Appendix Table A (continued): Protection structure
a in GTAP version 7p5 and in the 




GTAP version 7p5 
   























Subsidy  Tariff  Tariff 
                   
Morocco  0.0  -0.3  33.3  20.0    0.0  -0.4  28.4  20.0 
RestNAfrica  -3.9  0.5  24.9  13.1    -3.9  1.3  30.7  13.1 
South Africa  0.0  0.0  9.7  6.5    0.0  0.0  10.2  6.5 
Madagascar  0.0  0.0  3.9  2.7    0.0  -4.4  3.4  2.7 
Mozambique  0.2  0.0  12.5  10.9    0.2  0.0  14.5  10.9 
Zambia  -0.8  0.0  5.6  9.0    -0.8  0.0  7.0  9.0 
Zimbabwe  -3.2  0.0  13.6  15.4    -3.2  0.0  8.9  15.4 
Uganda  0.0  0.0  9.5  5.5    0.0  -2.6  9.2  5.5 
Tanzania  -0.3  0.0  11.6  13.7    -0.3  0.0  11.8  13.7 
Nigeria  0.1  0.0  74.0  17.2    0.1  0.0  76.1  17.2 
Senegal  0.0  0.0  8.4  8.9    0.0  -1.1  6.2  8.9 
RestWCAfrica  -0.2  0.0  10.5  8.9    -0.2  0.0  10.8  8.9 
RestAfrica  -0.4  0.0  10.4  14.1    -0.4  0.0  10.6  14.1 
Argentina  -4.9  0.0  2.9  5.7    0.0  -14.8  0.0  5.8 
Brazil  0.0  0.0  4.5  8.9    0.0  0.0  4.8  8.9 
Chile  -1.7  0.0  1.3  1.8    0.0  0.0  2.4  1.8 
Colombia  0.0  0.0  12.9  9.8    0.0  0.0  21.6  9.8 
Ecuador  0.0  0.0  6.8  10.4    0.0  0.0  13.4  10.4 
Mexico  1.3  0.0  8.6  3.4    1.2  0.0  6.2  3.4 
Nicaragua  0.0  0.0  8.0  3.9    0.0  -2.8  9.6  3.9 
RestLAC  -1.7  0.6  9.8  9.9    -1.7  0.3  9.9  9.9 
 
a Using value of production at undistorted prices as weights. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from GTAP version 7p5 and own estimates drawn from 
Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 